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The resort to and conduct of warfare has a long history of regulation. The set
of rules commonly known as the jus ad bellum provide the legal limits to the
commencement of warfare.2 The set of rules known as the jus in bello set forth the
legal limits to its conduct.3  The latter set of rules properly identifies all of the
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1. A very good example of an ancient Western tradition of some sense of justice in war is the
Roman general Scipio Africanus' equation of the talents of a great army general with that of a surgeon
who operates on a human body with due care not to cause an unnecessary injury. See STEPHEN C.
NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 21 (2005) [hereinafter NEFF]. A very good example of an
ancient non-Western tradition is contained in the Confucian Classic, The Book of Changes - I Ching,
Shih- The Army, http://www.cfcl.com/ching/P/07.20.shtml.
Long before the emergence of the traditional international legal theories of the nineteenth century, there
were serious discourses relating to the relevance of law to war. While some had dismissed law's
relevance to war entirely, others maintained its relevance at least in the sense of ethics, justice, and
religious values. Von Moltke and Clausewitz may be cited as examples of those who had dismissed the
law's relevance to war. See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 46 (1954) [hereinafter KENNEDY].
Catholic thinkers such as Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546), Francisco Suirez (1584-1617), and the
Protestant thinkers such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), may be cited
as those who have advocated the law's relevance to war in different forms. See id. at 48. For Professor
Kennedy's discussion of the works of the latter thinkers, see generally David Kennedy, Primitive Legal
Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986). See also, HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI
TRES, VOL. II 470 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (discussing the obligation of authors of war to
provide restitution).
2. In its current form, the jus ad bellum is essentially based on Article 2(4) and Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, ch. VII. See also George Aldrich, The
Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (2000), and FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD,
CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 84, 170 (International Committee of the Red Cross 2001)
(1987).
3. Jus in bello rules of most current importance are contained in the Four Geneva Conventions
of 1949 (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva
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parties involved in hostilities and defines their rights and responsibilities.4 In
contemporary usage, the latter set of rules is commonly referred to as International
Humanitarian Law (fIL).5 Although IHL is not premised on the recognition that
war is inevitable, 6 it seeks to mitigate the tragic consequences through regulations
whenever and wherever it occurs.' The difficult equilibrium that it seeks to
maintain is between military necessity and humanity. As early as 1868, one of the
landmark declarations known as the St. Petersburg Declaration neatly put the
difficult equation as "the technical limits at which the necessity of war ought to
yield to the requirements of humanity."9
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV], and the Two Additional Protocols of 1977
(Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II], and Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), art. 43, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403, reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR 67-84 (3rd ed. 2004) [hereinafter ROBERTS & GUELFF])).
4. It must, however, be noted that there are some overlaps between the jus ad bellum and jus in
bello rules at different levels. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 1-2.
5. The origin of this term is relatively recent and is not contained in the Geneva Conventions of
1949; however, it is currently used in relation to these Conventions and the Additional Protocols of
1977. See Christopher J. Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1-15 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2nd ed. 2008) [hereinafter FLECK].
"International Humanitarian Law comprises all those rules of international law which are designed to
regulate the treatment of the individual - civilian or military, wounded or active - in international
armed conflicts." Id. at 11. See also, ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the origins
and current usage of the term).
6. John Carey, Introduction to the Three-Volume Work, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW: ORIGINS xi-xii (John Carey et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter INTERN4TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.
ORIGINS] (discussing that in its solemn appeal to the international community on the occasion of the
50th Anniversary of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) urged all nations to reject the notion that war is inevitable and asked them to make
profound efforts to eliminate the underlying causes); Int'l Review of the Red Cross, People on War -
Solemn Appeal, 459-60, ICRC No. 835 (Sept. 30, 1999), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/
eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jq2r?opendocument.
7. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 20-26 (2004) [hereinafter DINSTEIN]. Some proponents of the complete abolition of
armed forces and peaceful resolution of all conflicts suggest that an attempt to regulate warfare may
prejudice its complete abolition. See, e.g., ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 28 (suggesting that
"the need to mitigate the worst effects of armed conflict, by upholding the idea that there are standards
of civilization by which conduct can be judged, remains. The legal regime embodying these standards
is by no means prejudicial to various proposals to limit the use of force, and may even contribute to the
achievement of broader ideas and objectives referred to above.").
8. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 16.
9. Id. at 17, explaining that:
[i]f military necessity were to prevail completely, no limitation of any kind would
have been imposed on the freedom of action of belligerent States: a la guerre
comme a la guerre. Conversely, if benevolent humanitarianism were the only
beacon to guide the path of armed forces, war would have entailed no bloodshed,
no destruction and no human suffering; in short war would not have been war.
Dinstein concludes by saying that Humanitarian Law essentially takes the middle
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The fundamental approach designed to attain a principled equilibrium
between military necessity and humanity is the definition of the status of each and
every party and individual involved and affected by warfare. The laws that
regulated warfare prior to the Second World War focused on the protection of
persons who had already fallen victim to warfare and rendered harmless, including
the wounded, the captive, and the interned.10 As the nature and magnitude of
warfare changed, the scope of its reach obviously widened."
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on
Geneva Convention IV notes that the legal norms that regulated warfare prior to
1945 "had only applied to the armed forces, a well-defined category of persons,
placed under the authority of responsible officers and subject to strict discipline"
but then it became necessary "to include an unorganized mass of civilians scattered
over the whole of the countries concerned."1 2 That essentially led to the adoption
of the Geneva Convention IV, which protects civilians in times of war.13 The
Convention identifies each individual involved in and affected by warfare and
defines the scope of protection.14
In the summary of rationales section of their introduction to Documents on
the Laws of War, professors Roberts and Guelff point out that one of the two most
important rationales of the laws of war is that "[a]rmed hostilities should as far as
possible be between organized armed forces, not entire societies: hence the efforts
to maintain a 'firebreak' distinguishing legitimate military targets from civilian
objects and people not involved in armed hostilities."15
It follows that the major distinction that the law makes is between combatants
and non-combatants or civilians. 16 This distinction is extremely important because
it determines the most important issue of who may kill or injure another human
being during combat without fear of prosecution.17  To this effect, article 43 of
Additional Protocol II provides that"[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to a
conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the
Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate
directly in hostilities."18  No other person is ordinarily entitled to a combatant
status. If a person who does not have a combatant status gets involved in
hostilities, he not only loses protection as a civilian but may also be prosecuted for
any actions, including for killing an enemy solider.19 Others claiming civilian
ground. Id. at 16-17.
10. See JEAN S. PICTET (ED.), ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949 RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 5 (1958).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3.
14. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 4 (defining protected persons).
15. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 27.
16. See FLECK, supra note 5, at 79-117 (discussing combatants and non-combatants).
17. See DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 29-31.
18. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43(2).
19. Id. at art. 45. See also FLECK, supra note 5, at 83.
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status who may be prosecuted include mercenaries, 20 Spies, 21 and other kinds of
unlawful combatants.22
In the post-Cold War era, the legal regulation of armed conflict has been
complicated by the advent of a remarkable new player: the privatized military
industry. 23  This multi-billion dollar industry drew its strength from providing
efficient services to sovereign governments.24 Today, private military contractors
operate from "Albania to Zambia" and perform anything from transporting food
and medicine to designing precision weaponry and performing outright combat
duties.25  Their clients range from brutal dictators to democratic governments and
26humanitarian agencies. Because IHL took its current shape and form prior to and
during the Cold War, the new players were not a significant part of the equation.
As such, the status of today's private military contractors is ambiguous at best.27
The debate over the desirability of engaging private military contracts in
activities traditionally performed by uniformed military personnel raises complex
20. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 47. ("A mercenary shall not have the right to be a
combatant or a prisoner of war."). This topic is discussed more fully in relation to civilian military
contractors in Part IV infra.
21. Id. at art. 46 (stating that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or this
Protocol, any member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who falls into the power of an
adverse Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and
may be treated as a spy"). See infra Parts III, IV.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY 8 (2003) [hereinafter CORPORATE WARRIORS].
24. No precise current date is available; however, older data suggests that from 1994 to 2002, the
Department of Defense of the United States entered into 3,000 contracts with private military contracts,
the value of which is estimated at about $300 billion. See id. at 15 (citing INT'L CONSORTIUM OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, MAKING A KILLING: THE BUSINESS OF WAR (2002)). The contracted out
duties included the maintenance and administration of B-2 bombers, the F-117 fighters, and several
surface warfare ships. Id. Obviously, the number has since increased dramatically because of the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the ratio of private contractors to uniformed military
personnel now is ten times more than the ratio during the Gulf War of 1991. P.W. Singer, War, Profits
and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 521, 522-23 (2004) [hereinafter War, Profits and the Vacuum ofLaw].
25. See CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 9.
26. Id. For example, the now defunct South African based military private contractor, Executive
Outcomes (EO), had provided combat serves to various factions in different African countries,
including in Sierra Leone and Angola, where its role was considered outcome-determinative. See it. at
4, 9. Although the United Nations has not yet involved private military contracts in peacekeeping
missions, proposals have surfaced from time to time. See e.g., U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation, 2001-02, H.C. 577, at 18 (cited in Laura A.
Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 394 (2006) [hereinafter
Public Law Values in a Privatized World]). See also Peter H. Gantz, Refugee International, The
Private Sector's Role in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, Global Pol'y F., Nov. 18, 2003 (cited in
id.).
27. In this article, the term "private military contractors" is used to limit the discussion to only a
segment of the wider private military industry with a recognizable role in armed conflict situations.
This limitation is important because the industry is otherwise extremely broad. In the words of Dr.
Singer, the industry is so broad that "many Americans unknowingly own slices of the industry in their
401(k) stock portfolio." War, Profits and the Vacuum ofLaw, supra note 24, at 522.
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legal, political, and socio-economic issues and is outside the scope of this article.
This article, however, attempts to characterize the status of civilian military
contractors under IHL, which has traditionally governed the conduct of armed
conflict where the status of all parties to the conflict is clearly defined, and identify
appropriate IHL standards that could be used for the regulation of civilian military
contractors. Professor David Kennedy makes an interesting observation when he
notes that "[i]n broader terms, modem war reflects modem political life. In large
measure, our modem politics is legal politics: the terms of engagement are legal,
and the players are legal institutions, their powers expanded and limited by law." 28
Accordingly, this article argues and properly assumes that the most pertinent body
of law is IHL because the very existence of the private military industry is
inextricably linked to the existence of the threat and use of military force; in other
words, the existence of war. It further contends, therefore, that identification of the
exact legal status under IHL of all the players is an essential step in understanding
and regulating their future role.
Because event driven scholarship often tends to focus on the specifics of the
given event, the legal literature that followed the news of the involvement of
private military contractors in the abuses that occurred in the Iraqi prisons,
particularly at Abu Ghraib, almost exclusively focused on ways and means of
holding them immediately accountable for their role in the reported abuses.29 Little
effort seems to have been made to assess their general status under IHL. Such
assessment is useful for several important reasons. Primarily, it identifies the gaps
in the existing law, not only as it pertains to their accountability, but also as it
relates to their own protection and the responsibilities of the states which host them
and use their services. Secondly, it offers an important guidance as to how to
supplement the gap and provide for their regulation. Thirdly, it helps to
reemphasize the notion that the principal theoretical foundation for the discourses
pertaining to the regulation of this particular industry must begin with IHL
standards.
With this view, this article is divided into five parts. Part II provides a
historical background on the legal limitations in warfare, and the monopoly of the
use of coercive force by states to the exclusion of all other types of entities,
including organized private forces. It also highlights the perceived necessity and
philosophical underpinnings of the monopoly of the use of force by the state. Part
III discusses the concept of lawful combatancy, and offers an analysis of the
28. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 13.
29. The seminal work that dealt with the issue of private military contractors following these
events was SINGER, supra note 23; see also, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing
Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
135, 142 (2005) [hereinafter Government for Hire] (advocating a contracts based accountability
approach); Public Law Values in a Privatized World, supra note 26, at 389 (advocating similarly for a
contracts based accountability approach); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing
Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REv. 989
(2005); Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction
over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L. REV. 367 (2006) (advocating a courts-
martial jurisdiction for civilian contractor misconduct) [hereinafter Peters].
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definition of the status of each and every party involved and affected by armed
conflict and sets the stage for the discussion of the status of today's private military
contractors. Part IV highlights the nature and functions of the private military
contracts and attempts to define their status under IHL based on the discussion in
Part III of the various possible statuses. To put their status into perspective, it
provides a detailed discussion of the various functions they perform in a legal
continuum, and suggests an IHL based theoretical framework for the regulation of
their operations. Part V concludes the article.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITATIONS IN WARFARE AND MONOPOLY OF THE USE
OF FORCE BY NATION-STATES
Part II provides a brief description of the historical and philosophical
underpinnings of limitations in warfare, and the notion, perceived necessarily, and
development of the monopoly of all instruments of coercion by the state.
A. Limitations in Warfare
Military historian J.F.C. Fuller notes that "[p]rimitive tribes are armed hordes,
in which every man is a warrior, and because the entire tribe engages in war,
warfare is total."30 He further notes that the objective of war was not only to defeat
the armed forces of the opposing tribes but to overturn their entire social
structure.3 In situations where every man is a warrior, and the objective is to
overturn the entire structure of the society, it is difficult to imagine the
applicability of recognizable limits to warfare. Writing in the context of the
historical development of state responsibility, Professor Brownlie noted that
"[t]racing the origins of legal concepts and institutions can be an artificial and
practically fruitless endeavor."3 2  Indeed, pinpointing to a particular historic
juncture during which states raised armies and monopolized all types of coercive
force to the exclusion of all other entities and began to abide by certain rules of
war could be very difficult.
In fact, perspectives seem to differ on whether limitations of humanity have
always characterized human conflict. For example, Professor Stephen Neff
suggests that war seems to have always been understood "as an exercise more in
skill and craftsmanship than blind anger or emotion."33 To support his position, he
quotes from Proverbs:
Wisdom prevails over strength,
Knowledge over brute force;
For wars are won by skilful strategy, and
victory is the fruit of long planning. 34
30. J.F.C. FULLER, THE CONDUCT OF WAR, 1789-1961 31 (1961), quoted in PETER MAGUIRE,
LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 38 (2000) [hereinafter MAGUIRE].
3 1. Id.
32. IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY PART I1 (1983).
33. NEFF, supra note 1, at 20.
34. Id. at 21 (quoting 24 Proverbs 5-6).
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He further notes that in Greek mythology, the goddess Athena symbolized not
only bravery but also knowledge, wisdom, and skill.35 Professor Neff also seeks
support from the ancient Chinese Confucian tradition of fair play in war.
According to this tradition, exploiting the weaknesses of the enemy was viewed as
dishonorable, and because of that, for example, the days and places of battle were
commonly fixed.36
Howard Levie takes a completely opposite point of view. He begins his thesis
with the following remark:
For many millennia there was no such thing as humanity in land
warfare. From the caveman to Biblical times, and for centuries
thereafter, the winner in battle took from the loser not only his life, but
also all of his available belongings, including women, children,
domestic animals, and personal property. 37
To support this conclusion, he cites to the following Biblical verse:
They made war on Midian as the Lord had commanded Moses, and slew
all men. In addition to those slain in battle, they killed the kings of
Midian - Evi, Rekem, Zur, Hur and Reba, the five kings of Midian -
and they put to death also Balaam, son of Beor. The Israelites took
captive the Midianite women and their dependents, and carried off their
beasts, their flocks, and their property. They burnt all their cities, in
which they had settled, and all their encampments. They took all the
spoil and plunder, both man and beast.38
Professor Peter Maguire takes a somewhat middle ground and asserts that, at
least in the European and American historical perspective, the rules of engagement
seem to have depended on the nature of the enemy. He begins his inquiry by
noting that "what is often overlooked is that the gentlemanly rules of war outlined
by both Christian scholars and the Heralds applied only to warriors of the same
race and class. When invasive 'others' like Norsemen and Muslims descended on
early European states, the only law of war was survival."3 9
In the American historical context, Professor Maguire cites historian Fredrick
Jackson Turner as saying that the first era of the formation of the United States
35. Id. at 20-21. Most scholarly inquiries regarding the origins of limitations in warfare began
from the ancient Greek and Roman times because historical evidence seems to suggest that the Greeks
and the Romans respected certain humanitarian principles, which later became the foundations of the
modem conception of the laws governing warfare. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 3 (citing
COLMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME, Vol.
11166-384 (1911)).
36. NEFF, supra note 1, at 22.
37. Howard S. Levie, Humanitarian Law and the Law of War on Land, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: ORIGINS, supra note 6, at 181.
38. Id. (quoting Numbers 31:7-11). Professor Levie also quotes verses from the Koran for an
exception: "When you meet in battle those who have disbelieved, smite their necks, and after the
slaughter tighten fast the bonds, until the war lays aside its burdens. Then either release them as a
favor, or in return for ransom." Id. (quoting Surah xlvii T 4 (M.Z. Kahn trans., 1971)).
39. MAGUIRE, supra note 30, at 19.
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required "determination and brutality" to clear and pacify the western frontiers.40
He further notes that "[b]efore there were 'war criminals,' there were 'barbarians,'
'heathens,' and 'savages,' who did not qualify as equals in the arena of 'civilized
warfare."' 41 He further notes that the founding fathers of the United States always
considered the American Indians barbarians. He cites President John Adams's
description of the Indian warfare of 1775: "The Indians are known to conduct their
Wars so entirely without Faith and Humanity, that it will bring eternal infamy . . ..
To let loose these blood Hounds to scalp Men and butcher Women and Children is
horrid."4 2 He concludes that this perception justified the lack of any traditional
European restraints to the means and methods of warfare vis-A-vis the indigenous
people.43 He contrasts this with the treatment of armed forces of the Confederacy
during the American Civil War. He notes that although the Federal Government
"did not consider the Rebel Army lawful combatants . . . they were not 'others'
who stood outside the circle and so not considered barbaric. This distinction was
reserved for racial and cultural others who flouted the military customs of the
West. The Confederates were both white and American."44
Although perspectives differ, it is clear that some concepts of restraint in
warfare and humanitarianism had earlier historical origins rooted in theological
and classical philosophical precepts. 45  The convergence of customs and the
attainment of general consensus on some fundamental principles of humanitarian
rules of warfare are phenomena that took a long time to crystallize.46 Indeed, it
was not until the nineteenth century that codifications of what might be considered
customary rules of warfare began.47 But then, the last century saw marked
advancement in the refinement and codification of customary norms of
humanitarian law.48 Currently, humanitarian law stands as one of the most highly
systematized and crystallized bodies of international law.




44. Id at 37. It is important to note that this does not mean that existing European norms of
restraint in warfare were respected in significant measure during the Civil War. Professor Maguire
gives many examples which suggest otherwise. For example, he quotes George Nicolas, General
Sherman's aide-de-camp as saying: "the only possible way to end this unhappy and dreadful conflict ...
is to make it terrible beyond endurance." Id. at 38 (quoting J.F.C. FULLER, THE CONDUCT OF WAR
1789-1961 109 (1961)). General Sherman himself said: "war is cruelty and you cannot refine it." Id.
Describing General Sherman's march on Atlanta, historian J.F.C. Fuller said: "Nothing like this march
had been seen in the West since the maraudings of Tilly and Wallenstien in the Thirty Years War ....
Terror was the basic factor in Sherman's policy, he openly says so." Id. at 39 (quoting J.F.C. FULLER,
DECIsIvE BATTLE OF THE U.S.A. 305-08 (1993)).
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B. Monopoly of the Use of Force by Organized and Disciplined Armed Forces of
the State
Today the world is seemingly organized into territorial unities under
sovereign entities. Although the political landscape is far more complicated than
this simple assertion,49 presumably, these sovereign entities command their own
armies and protect their own territorial integrity. Although different historic eras
saw different forms and shapes of the exercise of sovereign authority, the
underlying notion of the monopoly of the means of coercion by sovereign entities
of some sort is not a recent phenomenon.o Organized and disciplined militaries
existed as far back as the Greek and Roman times." Their organization was such
that some military offenses punishable by law today were also punishable under
the laws of the Greeks and the Romans.5 These offenses, for example, include
desertion, mutiny, violence to superiors, and the sale or misappropriation of arms.53
The punishment also included such familiar determinates as dishonorable
discharge.54
49. Commenting on the complexity of today's international political environment, Professor
David Kennedy said: "[T]he international political system today is a far more complex multilevel game
than the rows of equivalent national flags arrayed at U.N. headquarters would suggest. States and their
governments differ dramatically in powers, resources, and independence." KENNEDY, supra note 1, at
14.
50. P.W. Singer of the Brookings Institution provides a good historical background of the private
military industry in his seminal book, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 19-39. He argues that:
"In fact, the monopoly of the state over violence is the exception in world history, rather than the rule."
Id. at 19 (citing JANICE THOMSON, MERCENARIES (1994)). In conclusion, he quotes Jeffrey Herbst as
saying: "The private provision of violence was a routine aspect of international relations before the
twentieth century." Id. (quoting JEFFREY HERBST, THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FORCES, in
GREG MILLS & JOHN STREMLAU, THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY IN AFRICA, 117 (1997)).
Recognizing the significant role that private military service providers have played in history, Singer's
assessment that states' monopoly of the use of force has been the exception seems to be an
overstatement. In fact, towards the end of the chapter on the history of private warriors (chapter two),
Singer, himself, provides what seems to be a balanced account of their role. He states:
At numerous stages in history, governments did not possess anything
approaching a monopoly on force. Instead, rulers were often highly reliant on the
supply of military services from business enterprises. Private actors, such as free
companies, contracted units, military entrepreneurs, and charter companies
played key roles in state-building and often served governmental interests. These
organizations also had the tendency to become powers unto themselves, however,
and often grew superior in power to local political institutions, particularly in
areas of weak governance. Id. at 39.
His final and reasoned conclusion on the history and its importance reads: "In sum, the line between
economies and warfare were never clear-cut. From a broad view, the state's monopoly of both
domestic and international force was a historic anomaly. Thus, in that future, we should not expect that
organized violence would only be located in the public realm." Id.




54. Although no written military codes of these times remain today, this constitutes a part of the
historic record. See id
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As a natural continuation of this, the Romans did not consider a non-state
entity as an enemy proper. Cicero, for example, pointed out that a true enemy of
Rome must be a recognizable state possessing the following characteristics: "a
Commonwealth, a Senate-house, a treasury, a consensus of likeminded citizens."
According to him, an enemy state must be distinguished from irregular entities
such as pirates and bandits.56 Any operation to eradicate the latter category was
thus viewed as a law enforcement task rather than the conduct of war. 7 A similar
suggestion is contained in the classical work of Ulpain. According to him, any
armed forces other than states against which Rome declared war, or the vice versa,
are just "robbers and bandits" who must be dealt with accordingly.8 Cicero
further noted that irregular armed forces, such as bandits, did not have legal status
and unlike states, they neither acquired ownership title to any property they might
have captured nor did they possess any authority to enslave prisoners they might
have taken.59
Furthermore, states were not required to make deals or respect any truce made
with such irregular forces as opposed to other states.60 However, apparently some
such forces called the lactrociniae were so powerful that military operations were
61at times necessary to deal with them. Practically, Rome had to take a middle
ground by conducting a limited military campaign against them. 62 That does not
seem to have changed their perceived legal status.
The legitimacy and moral superiority of the monopoly of the use of force by
states is a complex subject. St. Augustine's characterization of the Roman State as
a "magna latrociniae" might be cited as an example of the school of thought that
challenges the moral superiority of the state with respect to the use of force to the
exclusion of others.63
Nonetheless, the perception of sovereign and lawful authority as opposed to
unlawful irregular forces persisted throughout history. For example, written
55. NEFF, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting Cicero, Philippics, at 143).
56. Id.
57. See id. (citing Cicero, On Duties, at 141).
58. Id. (citing Justinian, Digest, at 49.15.24).
59. Id. (citing Cicero, On Duties, at 17-18, 141-45).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 19 (citing Cicero, On Duties, at 78, n. 1).
62. See id. Although the scale of these operations may not be characterized as the conduct of
war, it is suggested that it is also difficult to characterize them as acts of law enforcement because the
scale of operations did not allow the determination of the criminal guilt of everyone involved. See id.
(citing O.F. ROBINSON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ANCIENT ROME 28-29 (1995)). This phenomenon is
also of current jurisprudential importance because it pertains to a critical point of departure between the
applicability of the emergency provisions of international human rights law which suggests an
emergency situation, and the applicability of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which
suggests the existence of a state of armed conflict. For commentary on this issue, see generally, OREN
GROSS & FIONNUALA Ni AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 326-64 (2006).
63. Patrick Giddy, Character and Professionalism in the Context of Developing Countries - the
Example of Mercenaries, 4 ETHIQUE ET ECONOMIQUE/ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 9 (2006) [hereinafter
Giddy]. "Magna latrociniae" is translated as "a great band of robbers." Id.
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European codes of military conduct date as far back as the fifth century.64 In his
seminal treatise, William Winthrop states that existing military codes of
continental Europe have their origins in the French ordonnance of military law of
1378; the first German Kriegsartikel of 1487, and the celebrated 1532 penal code
of Emperor Charles V.65
That is not to suggest that irregular armed forces such as mercenaries did not
play a significant role in shaping the history of the world. Machiavelli's discussion
of mercenaries and other irregular forces that he calls auxiliaries and mixed
soldiery in The Prince, is instructive on how involved they were in the political
and military environment of Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Europe.66
Although it seems that many legitimate authorities sought their assistance in
67
different forms, it is clear that they were a disfavored group of discrete entities.
Although it may not be representative of the general opinion that prevailed during
that time in Europe, Machiavelli suggests that relying on mercenaries for military
duties was utterly useless: 68
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are
either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds
his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for
they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant
before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of
God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the
attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy.
The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field
than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to
die for you.69
The history of the British military's laws of proper conduct offers another
example of the importance historically attached to assignment of the responsibility
of the use of coercive force to an organized, disciplined, and accountable entity.
Published statutory military codes of Great Britain date as far back as 1689.70
Much older British laws of military discipline and conduct existed. These laws
took the form of specific directives or orders issued from the government to the
army.
7 1
64. These military laws were incorporated in what is called the Salic Code, originally compiled
by the Chiefs of the Salians during this period. See WINTHROP, supra note 51, at 17-18. This Code was
revised and improved by successive Frankish kings. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 18. William Winthrop also lists other notable laws of military discipline including the
Articles of War of the Netherlands of 1590, republished in 1705; the regulations of Louis XIV of 1651
and 1665; and the Penal code of 1768 of the Empress Maria Theresa. Id.
66. NICOL( MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, reprinted in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD
17-21 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed.,1952).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 18.
69. Id.
70. See WINTHROP, supra note 51, at 19.
71. Id. at 18. "They were commonly ordained directly by the King, by virtue of his royal
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One of the most important requirements of these laws has been the taking of
the oath of fidelity. For example, the Articles of War of James II issued in 1688
required every officer and other member of the army to take the following oath:
I, A.B., Do swear to be true and faithful to my Sovereign Lord King
JAMES, and to His Heirs and Lawful Successors; and to be Obedient in
all things to His General, Lieutenant General, or Commander in Chief of
His Forces, for the time being, And will behave myself obediently
towards my Superior Officers in all they shall command me for His
Majesty's Service .... I do likewise Swear, That I believe, That it is not
lawful upon any Pretence whatsoever, to take Arms against the King
and that I do Abhor that Traitorous Position of taking Arms by His
Authority against His Person, or against those that are Commissioned by
Him. So help me God.72
The oath of allegiance and fidelity to a sovereign entity remained at all times
relevant to military service. It would not be an overstatement to say that an oath is
perhaps one of the most important features that distinguishes a regular and
disciplined military force from all other types of forces.
The history of law of the United States military is directly and immediately
linked to the British military articles and codes briefly mentioned above. In fact,
the raising of the armed forces of the United States predated the Constitution of the
United States itself. It was on June 14, 1775, that the Continental Congress
"resolved" to raise a military force and set up a committee consisting of George
Washington and three other members to draft rules and regulations for the
administration of the armed forces so raised.73 The committee then drafted a
military code consisting of sixty-nine articles. This code fundamentally relied on
the same principles as the British army.74 William Winthrop makes an interesting
observation when he notes that the two opposing armies were in fact governed by a
similar set of military rules.
With the adoption of the United States Constitution, all preexisting military
laws became part of the constitutional system.76 The Constitution leaves no room
prerogative, and with the aid and counsel of his peers, especially of the High Constable and Earl
Marshall, official . . . viewed by some writers as the proper original of the court-martial in England."
Id. (citing FRANCIS GROSE, MILITARY ANTIQUITIES RESPECTING A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH ARMY 58
(1801)).
72. ARTICLE OF WAR OF JAMES II; RULES AND ARTICLES FOR THE BETTER GOVERNMENT OF HIS
MAJESTIES LAND FORCES IN PAY (1688), art. VI., reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 51, at 920-28
(emphasis in original). It is important to note that implicit in the contents of this oath is the notion that
only the sovereign can raise and maintain armed forces to the exclusion of all others.
73. See id. at 21 (quoting 1 Journals of Congress, 82). The other four members of the committee
were Philip Schuyler, Silas Deane, Thomas Cushing, and Joseph Hewes. Id.
74. The immediate precursor of this code was, however, the Massachusetts Articles, which is said
to be the first American Code of military conduct. Id.
75. Seeid. at22n.81.
76. See id. at 15. "The Constitution itself provides for military government as well as for civil
government.... There is no law for the government of the citizens, the armies, or the navy of the United
States, within American jurisdiction, which is not contained in or derived from the Constitution."
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for doubt that only Congress could raise, maintain, and regulate armed forces.
The President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is responsible for
the "faithful" execution of the laws. 8 Commenting about the role of the military
following the American Civil War, Professor Peter Maguire wrote that"[a]bove all,
what the Civil War demonstrated was the military was no longer the praetorian
guard of the political elite. Instead, it was an instrument of democracy, and
democratic political leaders could not be content to win a limited military victory
and striking an advantageous diplomatic solution." 79  Similarly, contemporary
political scientist Samuel Huntington remarked that "[w]hile all professions are to
some extent regulated by the state, the military profession is monopolized by the
state."80
Given this historical background, the legal status of any other types of armed
forces is a matter that needs to be looked into very carefully.
III. LAWFUL COMBATANCY, IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES, AND STATE
RESPONSIBILITY
Part III offers a detailed discussion of the various possible statuses that every
party involved in and affected by warfare may have in a continuum. It also
provides a description of the consequences attached to each legal status, including
individual and state responsibility. By so doing, it identifies the parameters by
which the status of private military contractors must be measured.
A. Theoretical Background ofLawful Combatancy
The philosophical underpinnings of lawful combatancy are perhaps more
complex than the legal prescriptions. In simple terms, a morally justifiable war, or
a just war as to which it is often referred, would require right intentions, legitimate
authority, and proportionate ends." Michael Brough notes that "if the war is
(quoting Chief Justice Chase, in Ex Parte Milligan 4 Wallace, 137).
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be
for a longer term than two years; To provide and maintain a navy; To make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide for
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections
and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of
the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the
officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress.
78. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2, & 3. The President's powers include the commissioning of
officers of the armed forces.
79. MAGUIRE, supra note 30, at 38.
80. CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 8 (quoting SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER
AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 37 (1957)).
81. See Michael W. Brough, Dehumanizing the Enemy and the Moral Equality of Soldiers, in
MICHAEL W. BROUGH, JOHN W. LANGO, HARRY VAN DER LINDEN, RETHINKING THE JUST WAR
TRADITION 149, 162 (eds., 2007). Of course, this is a simplification of the deep philosophical inquiry
that dates as far back as the history of warfare itself. The fundamental assumption throughout history
remained to be that a legitimate authority may employ force in self-defense or for some legitimate
reason and use proportionate means to attain the objective. For a succinct summary of the early
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justified . . . then the soldiers must be allowed to kill. States must be allowed to
direct the killing. ... 82 Even if the decision by the state to go to war may not be
justified or is in violation of the jus ad bellum, from a philosophical perspective,
the soldiers who are ordered to kill may not lose their moral authority. In this
respect, Michael Walzer notes:
[T]he moral status of individual soldiers on both sides is very much the
same: they are led to fight by their loyalty to their own states and by
their lawful obedience. They are most likely to believe that their wars
are just . . . . they are not criminals; they face one another as moral
equals. 83
There is no dispute that loyalty to one's own state, citizenship, and obedience
to the laws of the states are the important justifications for the soldiers' moral as
well as legal authority to defend his or her nation and kill on its behalf when the
circumstances so demand. It is this fundamental moral and legal authority that is
usually missing in profit-driven military enterprise. In relation to this notion,
Professor Patrick Giddy notes:
But killing is not proportional to the private ends of contractual
warriors, whatever these might be - say, supporting a middle-class
family: this end is not grave enough to justify killing. Killing is only a
proportionally appropriate act when military action for the just cause
(restoring justice and peace) has been embarked upon by the proper
authority, as a last resort with a reasonable chance of success.84
These historical and philosophical notions underpin the legal classification of
parties involved and contribute to the legitimate use of force. Professor David
Kennedy makes an important observation when he notes that the earlier thinkers
considered the law not only as an ethical limit on military power but also as a
license. This suggestion has an enduring relevance to IHL because it pertains to
the issue of lawful combatancy. In other words, it raises the question of who has
the license to kill another human being without fear of prosecution. Writing from
a moral and philosophical perspective, Pauline Kaurin notes:
medieval, the medieval, the early modem and contemporary paradigms of the just war doctrine, see
generally, William E. Murnion, A Postmodern View of Just War, in STEVEN P. LEE, INTERVENTION,
TERRORISM, AND TORTURE 23, 23-40 (2007) [hereinafter INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE].
82. Brough, supra note 81, at 163.
83. Brough, supra note 81, at 149 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (3d ed.
2000)). Michael Brough further notes that according to Grotius, less than half of the wars ever fought
were justified and according to the jus ad bellum. Accordingly, any randomly chosen war would be
without justification. But in any case, the soldiers who were recruited by their states to fight and kill
would be justified regardless of the justness of the war. See DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF DEFENSE,
165-73 (2002), cited in id at 150. For a critique on Michael Walzer's, Just and Unjust Wars, see also,
David Duquette, From Rights to Realism: Incoherence, in Walzer's Conception of Jus in Bello, in
STEVEN P. LEE, INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE, supra note 81, at 41-57. See also Patrick
Hubbard, A Realist Response to Walzer's Just and Unjust War, in LEE, INTERVENTION, TERRORISM,
AND TORTURE, supra note 81, at 57-71 (2000).
84. See Giddy, supra note 63, at 13.
85. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 49.
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The clarity of the combatant / noncombatant distinction is crucial since
it preserves the essential moral difference between a soldier and a
murderer; the difference between doing one's duty and committing a
war crime; the difference between coming home in honor or coming
home in shame, with the attendant effects for both the soldier and
society. If this distinction cannot be rendered in a way that is practical
in the field, soldiers become murderers, committers of war crimes and
bearers of individual and collective shame. 86
The legal ramifications are even more serious. The following section
provides a detailed discussion of the legal status of the various parties involved and
affected by warfare and describes their rights and responsibilities. It is intended to
set the stage for the discussion of the particular status of the private military
contractors by showing the continuum of the various types of legal statuses under
IHL. Because private military contractors perform various types of activities, their
status would naturally depend on the types of activities they perform. The
discussion of an activity-based continuum of legal statuses in Part III provides the
standards against which the functions of the private military contractors should be
measured.
B. Overview ofLegal Statuses under International Humanitarian Law
In July 2002, fifteen-year old Omar Khadr allegedly threw a grenade and
killed Sergeant Christopher J. Speer of the U.S. military during a firefight in
southeastern Afghanistan. 7 He was later captured, held at Guantinamo Bay,
Cuba, and brought to justice.88 The fundamental legal question in his preliminary
hearing before a military commission set up by the U.S. military for this purpose89
86. Pauline Kaurin, When Less Is Not More: Expanding the Combatant/Noncombatant
Distinction, in BROUGH, ET AL., RETHINKING THE JUST WAR TRADITION, supra note 81, at 116.
87. See Josh White, Charges Against Guantanamo Detainee Set for Trial Dropped Over Limit on
Law, WASH. POST, June 5, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2007/06/04/AR2007060400188.html [hereinafter White].
88. Id. at 1.
89. The constitutionality of military tribunals set up to try persons detained in relation to the
armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has remained a subject of great controversy. For a discussion
of constitutional issues relating to this matter, see generally, Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002). This
particular Military Commission was set up following the enactment of the Military Commission Act of
2006, Pub L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). Prior to the enactment of this law, several cases
challenged earlier attempts by the government to try detainees by ad hoc military tribunals. For
example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the government should provide a
meaningful opportunity for detainees to contest the factual allegations against them before a neutral
decision maker. The respondent in this case was a U.S. citizen. The Court suggested that a military
commission duly constituted by an act of Congress would be sufficient. See generally, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Thereafter, Congress enacted the Military Commission Act cited
above. Other cases that dealt with related jurisdictional issues include: Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426 (2004). Particularly relevant to the passage of the Military Commission Act was the Supreme
Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) (requiring a congressional act for the
establishment of a military commission and suggesting minimum requirements of due process).
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was his combatant status.90 The Military Commission suspended the charges
against him on the grounds that his combatant status merely states "enemy
combatant" while the Commission's jurisdiction only extends to the trial of
"unlawful enemy combatants." 91 Determination of whether he was a lawful or
unlawful combatant would essentially decide his fate, because if he had lawful
combatant status when he caused the death of Sergeant Speer, he would be
immune from prosecution.92 The following quote from Professor Dinstein's book
on the conduct of hostilities properly explains the essence of this assertion:
90. See White, supra note 87.
91. Id. The usage of the terms "enemy combatant" and "unlawful enemy combatant" has recently
been a source of some dispute primarily because of their inconsistent usage in the past in domestic and
international jurisprudence. Nowhere is the term "enemy combatant" defined. The term first appeared
in the U.S. domestic case of Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). For a discussion of the history of this
case, see Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the
Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REv. 59 (1980). Quirin is a World War II case. In this case, eight
German-born men were apprehended while attempting to sabotage installations in the U.S. and brought
before a military commission. The Court held that their trial by a military commission was lawful. See
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45. The Court had to distinguish this World War II decision from its Civil War
decision of Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). In Milligan, the Court held that the use of military
tribunals is not appropriate where the courts are open and their processes unobstructed. More
particularly, the Court stated:
It follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are occasions when
martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the
courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice
according to law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war
really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority,
thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power
is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can
have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for,
if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross
usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and
in the proper and unobstructed exercise oftheir jurisdiction. It is also confined to
the locality of actual war." Id. at 80-8 1.
The Quirin court distinguished this ruling. The major point of distinction that the Court made was that
in Quirin, the defendants were "enemy combatants," while in Milligan, they were U.S. citizens who
were alleged to have committed military-related crimes in peacetime. It is, however, clear from the
reading of the Quirin opinion that the Court used the term "enemy combatants" to mean "unlawful
combatants" because it characterized the defendants as not wearing uniforms, and secretly passing
across enemy lines in a time of war. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. Subsequent cases did not elaborate the
usage of terminologies in Quirin. As such, the usage of the terminologies became a subject of dispute
following the commencement of the current terrorism-related war in 2001. To clarify the uncertainty
relating to the usage of terms, the Military Commission Act of 2006 used the term "unlawful enemy
combatant" and defined it as one who is not a "lawful enemy combatant." See Military Commission
Act of 2006, supra note 89. The issue in the pending Omar Khadr case, which the Military
Commission suspended, centered exactly on the designation of the individual as an "enemy combatant"
as opposed to an "unlawful enemy combatant" by the military's status review tribunals. The
Commission deemed this distinction important because the Act limits the Commission's jurisdiction to
the trial of "unlawful combatants" and the defendant was not so designated by the military. See White,
supra note 87, at 2.
92. See White, supra note 87, at 2.
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At bottom, warfare by its very nature consist of a series of acts of
violence (like homicide, assault, battery and arson) ordinarily penalized
by the criminal codes of all countries. When a combatant, John Doe,
holds a rifle aims it at Richard Roe (a soldier belonging to the enemy's
armed forces) with the intent to kill, pulls the trigger, and causes
Richard Roe's death, what we have is a premeditated homicide fitting
the definition of murder in virtually all domestic penal codes. If, upon
being captured by the enemy, John Doe is not prosecuted for murder,
this is due to one reason only. LOIAC [Law of International Armed
Conflict, a body of International Humanitarian Law] provides John Doe
with a legal shield, protecting him from trial and punishment, by
conferring upon him the status of a prisoner of war. If John Doe acts
beyond the pale of a lawful combatancy, LOIAC removes the protective
shield. Thereby, it subjects John Doe to the full rigour of the enemy's
domestic legal system, and the ordinary penal sanctions provided by that
law will become applicable to him. 93
That is precisely why the Military Commission in the aforementioned Omar
Khadr case suspended the trial - so that the Commission could first determine
Khadr's legal status.
As indicated above, the most fundamental distinction that IHL makes is
between combatants and non-combatants. This distinction essentially defines the
legal status of all parties involved. It generally provides for their rights and
responsibilities.94 As a preliminary matter, it is important to note the distinction
between primary and secondary statuses that IHL assigns to persons involved in
situations of warfare. A primary status is a status that the particular individual
possesses as a matter of his or her assignment by his or her state as a combatant or
a non-combatant. 95 A secondary status is a status that arises out of the primary
96status but attaches as a result of a change in circumstances. For example, a
person with a primary combatant status would acquire a prisoner of war status in a
case of capture by the enemy state. The prisoner of war status can then be
considered a secondary status that emanates from the primary status of being a
lawful combatant. With this noted, the following sections discuss the legal status
of persons involved in warfare in different capacities.
C. Combatants and Non-combatants / Civilians
The general premise is contained in article 3 of the Hague Regulations. It
provides that "[t[he armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of
combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a
93. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 31.
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right to be treated as prisoners of war."98 Article 43 of Protocol I redefines the
same principle and provides more elaborate guidance. It states:
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized
armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible
to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an
adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than
medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third
Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to
participate directly in hostilities.
3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed
law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other
Parties to the conflict.99
This definition articulates two fundamental principles. The first principle
requires a chain of command and subordination as necessary elements. Mainly
states,100 as subjects of international law, may lawfully raise and deploy armed
forces as their agents in their international relations.10 1 The second important
principle contained in this provision is that "non-combatants" may also be
considered as constituting the armed forces of a state.102 Members of the armed
forces that are classified as non-combatants are not authorized to take part in
98. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), art. 43, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403
[hereinafter Hague II], reprinted in ROBERTS, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 3, at 73-
84. Article 1 of the Hague II provides for the qualifications of belligerents. It states:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 1. To be commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates; 2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance; 3. To carry arms openly; and 4. To conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. In countries were
militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included
under the denomination 'army'.
Id. at art. 1.
99. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43.
100. The application of IHL does not depend on the recognition of the government of the state in
question by the enemy. For example, Geneva Convention III makes it clear that armed forces of a
government that is not recognized by the enemy state must be accorded prisoner of war status provided
all the requirements of lawful combatancy are met. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art.
4(A)(3). See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 44. It is also important to note that this
provision may also apply to non-state actors as long as they have a recognizable chain of command and
discipline and meet the remaining requirements discussed more fully below.
101. See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in FLECK, supra note 5, at 66.
102. Id.
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armed hostilities or combat activities.1 0 3 This category usually includes medical
and religious personnel. 104 Summarizing these principles, Professor Ipsen notes:
This means that only a party to a conflict which is a subject of
international law can have armed forces whose members are
combatants. This reflects the basic relation in international law between
the state (as a subject of international law), and its armed forces (as its
organ), and the members of armed forces (as combatants).0 5
Elaborating the principle further, Professor Ipsen notes that article 3 of
Protocol I makes it clear that as a matter of international legal definition, if a state
maintains armed forces, members of the armed forces would ipso facto acquire
combatant status. 106 As such, they would have the legal authority to directly take
part in hostilities. 10 He further notes that while the express exception is medical
and religious personnel, a state may also designate, by an internal act, other
members of the armed forces to be non-combatants.108 By so arguing, he refutes
an opposing argument, which suggests that a state possesses a broad authority to
classify members of its armed forces as combatants and non-combatants. 109 The
plain reading of the principle enshrined under article 3 paragraph 2 of Protocol I
clearly supports Professor Ipsen's contention that all members of the armed forces
of a state, except medical and religious personnel, are as a matter of principle
presumed to be combatants.110 However, a state may, by an internal act, designate
some of such members as non-combatants.n "[R]educed to a concise formula: a
member of the armed forces is a combatant by nature; the status of non-combatant
can only be granted to a member of the armed forces by an internal constitutive
legal act."1 12
It follows that persons possessing combatant status are immune from
prosecution for any lawful combat activity, which may include fighting, killing,
and causing destruction within the legal limits.113 They will also be entitled to
prisoner of war status if captured by the enemy.114 However, if persons who do not
possess combatant status take part in hostilities and cause the same type of injury
and damage as combatants, they are considered unlawful combatants and are
punishable as criminals. 15  Non-combatants or civilians11 6 who do not "take a




106. See Ipsen, supra note 5, at 67-68.
107. Id. at 68.
108. See id. at 66.
109. Id.
110. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43, para. 2.
111. See Ipsen, supra note 5, at 68.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 68.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Additional Protocol I, defines a civilian as:
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The primary objective of this distinction is to ensure that armed hostilities are
conducted only between disciplined armed forces of states, which presumably
respect the laws and customs of warfare. 119 Equally important is the fundamental
principle that seeks to identify civilians for protection. The lack of identification
of civilians in combat activities vitiates two fundamental assumptions of
humanitarian law. First of all, the identification is important because without
identification they can never be protected. Secondly, combatants who pose as
civilians mislead the enemy and take inappropriate advantage. For these reasons
identification remains extremely crucial. 120 For example, combatants may hide
among bushes to mislead the enemy but not among civilians for the same
purpose. 121 If they do so, they lose their privileges as combatants and may be
prosecuted for whatever conduct they perform and injury they make possible. 122
That is precisely why the law imposes punishment when those who are supposed
to be protected as civilians take part in hostilities or commit "acts harmful to the
enemy." 123  In fact, combatants are required to identify themselves as far as
possible by carrying arms openly, wearing uniforms, and carrying distinctive
emblems. 124  Although the practicability of all of these requirements may be
problematic, they make the importance attached to the identification process clear.
Although the principle seems straightforward, the identification of persons
who have a combatant status and those who take part in hostilities without having
such status may be problematic. The appropriate legal test is contained in article
51, paragraph 3 of Protocol I. It states that "[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities."12 5 As soon as civilians take part in hostilities, not only are they not
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of
persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention
and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian,
that person shall be considered to be a civilian. 2. The civilian population
comprises all persons who are civilians. 3. The presence within the civilian
population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does
not deprive the population of its civilian character.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 50.
117. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art 51(3).
118. The protection of civilians during armed conflict is perhaps the most fundamental legal
principle of IHL. As a matter of fact, the whole of Geneva Convention IV is dedicated to the protection
of civilians. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, at arts. 50-51.
119. See DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 27.
120. Id.
121. See Denise Bindschedler-Robert, A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflict, The Law
of Armed Conflict: Report of the Conference on Contemporary Problems of the Law of Armed
Conflicts, 1969 1, 43 (1971), cited in DINSTEN, supra note 7, at 29.
122. See DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 29.
123. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 13 (providing that medical personnel who
engage in acts that are considered harnful to the enemy could lose their protection as civilians).
124. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4(A); see also Additional Protocol I, supra
note 3, art. 44. For a comprehensive discussion of all the requirements of lawful combatancy, see
DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 33-47.
125. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(3) (emphasis added). Although this provision
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entitled to protection as civilians, but they may also be subjected to prosecution as
unlawful combatants. 126  As indicated above, the determination of direct
involvement in hostilities could be very difficult. Nowhere is this standard
defined. For example, would a civilian truck driver who delivers a supply of
ammunition to combatants be considered to have taken a direct part in hostilities
and lose his civilian status? What if the delivery was foodstuff? The ICRC Model
Manual answers the former in the affirmative but the latter in the negative. 127 How
about a civilian who collects intelligence in enemy occupied territories? What if
she does the same work while sitting in an office thousands of miles away from the
place of hostilities? The ICRC Model Manual again answers the former in the
affirmative but the latter in the negative. 128  Be this as it may, however, the
difficulty of the application of this standard cannot be over stated. In fact, as of the
writing of this article, the ICRC is struggling to define and elaborate the direct
participation standard. 129
Professor Dinstein notes that because nobody is born a combatant, combatants
may become non-combatants and vice versa.130 He cautions, however, that a
constant shift in status may create serious problems.131 In line with this, he says
"one cannot fight the enemy and remain a civilian."132 To support this conclusion
he cites to the Paris Declaration of 1856, one of the very first modem codifications
of laws and customs of warfare in the sea. The very first article of this Declaration
provides: "Privateering is, and remains, abolished." 3 3 Privateers were organized
groups who attacked enemy merchant vessels upon the official request by the
governments of belligerent states.134 The law of warfare on land subsequently
proscribed the same types of conduct by agents who paralleled the privateers of the
maritime world.135
contains perhaps the clearest expression of this principle, it is derived from Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and it now appears in various provisions.
126. International Committee of the Red Cross, Official Statement: The Relevance of lHL in the
Context of Terrorism, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705.
127. See DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 27-28 (citing A.P.V. Rogers & P. Malherbe, Model Manual on
the Law ofArmed Conflict, 29 (ICRC, 1999)).
128. Id.
129. The ICRC has recently released a detailed interpretive guide on the notion of direct
participation on hostilities. The report is guide is available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-ihl-article-020609/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009-
ICRC.pdf. Since the specific meaning of this notion is outside of the scope of this article, no attempt
is made to discuss the contents of the guide. It must, however, be emphasized that this guide is very
useful in drawing the lines between the permissible and impermissible involvements of private military
contractors.
130. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 28.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 27-28 (citing A.P.V. Rogers & P. Malherbe, Model Manual on the Law of Armed
Conflict, 29 (ICRC, 1999)).
133. Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, 1856, Laws of Armed Conflicts 787, 788, cited
in DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 28.
134. Id. They are sometimes called corsairs.
135. Id.
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The other two important factors included in the definition of armed forces are
the existence of a chain of command and internal discipline. 136  The chain of
command and discipline requirements are necessary because of the state
responsibility attached to the conduct of organs operating at the behest of the state,
which is a subject of international law. 1 37 The law gives a state some flexibility as
to who it may incorporate into its armed forces, including militia and volunteer
corps.13 8 However, it also requires the state to maintain a chain of command and
ensure discipline. 139 In other words, it requires the state to ensure respect for IHL.
The failure by any organ associated with the government to observe rules of IHL
could potentially give rise to international legal responsibility for the state. 140 That
is another important reason why states must be certain of the status of any entities
with which they engage in any type of warfare-related duties. They should
particularly be careful in involving forces outside their military's chain of
command and not subject to their discipline. The last part of this section will be
discussed more fully in Part IV below.
D. Non-combatants Accompanying the Armed Forces
Non-combatants may lawfully accompany armed forces and are entitled to
civilian status as long as they refrain from combat activities. 14 1 Their primary
status is civilian. 142 A near exhaustive list of non-combatants who are entitled to
civilian status is contained in article 4A(4) of Geneva Convention III. It accords
the following civilians prisoner of war status: "Persons who accompany the armed
forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of
military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of the
armed forces." 43 This category also includes "[m]embers of crews, including
masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civilian
aircraft of the Parties to the conflict."1 4 4
The Convention also requires that such persons obtain authorization from the
armed forces which they accompany, and carry an identity card that mimics a
model that the Convention provides. 145  Identification and ascertainment of all
parties involved in conflict situations is so important that the Convention provides
a model identity card for state parties to issue to civilians that accompany their
armed forces. 146 The card, which is reproduced below, specifically asks parties to
complete the following statement: "Accompanying the armed forces as ... ." The
answer must be specific. As is seen below, it also requires the identification of the
136. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43(1).
137. See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in FLECK, supra note 5, at 70-71.
138. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, at art 43.
139. Id.
140. See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in FLECK, supra note 5 supra note 5, at
71.
141. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 13.
142. See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in FLECK, supra note 5, at 95.
143. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4(A)(4).
144. Id. at art. 4(A)(5).
145. Id.
146. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, Annex IV.
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issuing authority. All persons who accompany the armed forces as non-
combatants must carry this identification card. 147 The card serves as evidence of
authorization to perform whatever civilian duties that the person carrying the card
performs. Most importantly, if a civilian falls in the hands of the enemy, it would
serve as evidence of entitlement to prisoner of war status. 148
ANNEX IV
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Civilian status has significant benefits. Persons having a status of "civilian
accompanying the armed forces," and identified as such could be entitled to dual
protection. Firstly, they cannot be targeted by the enemy. Secondly, they are
147. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art 4(A)(4); see also the "Notice" section of the
card reproduced above.
148. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4(A)(4).
149. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, Annex IV, sample available at http://www.icrc.org
/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument (last visited June 6, 2007).
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entitled to prisoner of war status if they fall into the hands of enemy forces. The
two protections are discussed in turn below.
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I articulates what could be considered one
of the most fundamental principles of IHL. The essence of this provision is the
protection of civilians. It states in part: "Those who plan or decide upon an attack
shall: (i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection."150
The same provision goes on stating that persons who plan an attack must "refrain
from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."151 It further provides that "effective advance warning shall
be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless the
circumstances do not permit." 15 2 And of course, what this essentially requires is
the reasonable balancing of the interests of military advantage and the extent of
collateral damages. 153  It is important to note that by accompanying the armed
forces, civilians assume the risk of becoming collateral victims. Such
victimization may not necessarily be a result of the enemy's unlawful conduct if
the military advantage it obtains by including civilians in the attack outweighs the
civilian injury caused by the attack. 154
The second important protection that civilians accompanying the armed
forces get is a prisoner of war status if they fall into the hands of the enemy. As
indicated above, Geneva Convention III specifically accords civilians who
accompany the armed forces, and are properly identified as such, prisoner of war
status.155 Prisoner of war status is extremely beneficial not only because persons
having such status must be repatriated to their country as soon as hostilities
cease, 156 but also because it entitles the prisoner to several protections while in
captivity.157
In the case of combatants, as discussed in Part II above, it would serve as a
shield from prosecution for death, injury, and damage they might have caused
150. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
151. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
152. Id. art. 57(2)(c).
153. See, e.g., id. art. 57(2)(b)
[A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
154. See id.
155. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4(A).
156. See also Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, arts. 109-17 (providing for circumstances
whereby repatriation should occur prior to the conclusion of hostilities). See id. arts. 118-19.
157. Protection begins from the time of captivity, see, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 3,
art. 17-20. For protection during internment, see id. § II.
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during combat.158 What is extremely important to note here is that if civilians
conduct themselves outside their civilian duties and are suspected of combat
behavior, the repercussions could be extremely serious. Not only would they lose
their protection as civilians, but they would also lose prisoner of war status and
may be prosecuted for war crimes and other related forms of criminal offenses,
which they could have avoided if they had a combatant status. That is precisely
the reason why there should be no room for lack of identification of the exact
status of persons involved in any capacity in situations of hostility.
The provisions of Additional Protocol I relating to the protection of medical
personnel demonstrate the link between legal status and the treatment the status-
holder must receive.
Article 12 provides that medical personnel must be protected at all times and
must not be made targets of attack;15 9 however, this provision conditions the
protection on numerous specific grounds. These grounds include: (1) the given
civilian medical unit must "belong to one of the Parties to the conflict"1 60 and (2)
they must be "recognized and authorized by the competent authority of one of the
Parties to the conflict" 16 1 or otherwise be authorized by Parties permitted by the
Protocol and Geneva Convention 1.162 Moreover, the parties are required to
identify the locations of their medical units so that they may not be targeted by the
enemy. 163 Of course, shielding military objectives from attack under the pretext of
medical units is strictly prohibited. 164
Most importantly, the Protocol provides for conditions for the discontinuance
of protection to civilian medical units. It provides that protection may cease if they
are "used to commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the
enemy." 165 The Protocol does not define what constitutes "acts harmful to the
enemy;" however, it contains a list of acts that are not considered harmful to the
enemy. 166 The opposite could easily be extrapolated from the list.
The following are not considered to be harmful to the enemy:
a. that the personnel of the unit are equipped with light individual
weapons for their own defense or for that of the wounded and sick in
their charge;
b. that the unit is guarded by a picket or by sentries or by an
escort;
158. See DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 31.
159. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 12(1).
160. See id. art. 12(2)(a).
161. See id. art. 12(2(b).
162. Other parties such as neutral powers and humanitarian agencies may deploy medical workers.
See id. art. 12(2)(c) and the provisions cross-referenced therein. This is a prime demonstration of the
strict regulation of who may do what lawfully.
163. See id. art. 12(3).
164. Id. art. 12(4).
165. Id. art. 13(1).
166. Id. art. 13(2).
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c. that small arms and ammunition taken from the wounded and
sick, and not yet handed to the proper service, are found in the units;
d. that the members of the armed forces or other combatants are in
the unit for medical reasons. 167
Presumably, the same principle applies to all other categories of civilians
accompanying the armed forces. The Protocol provides for a related concept that
would disqualify all civilians from the protection accorded to civilians. It states:
"[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 168
A cumulative reading of these provisions suggests that there is, indeed, a red
line that must not be crossed by anyone claiming civilian status. Although factual
disputes as to the applicability of the standard are inevitable, IHL seems to have
drawn the line at the performance of any action that could reasonably be
interpreted as taking a direct part in hostilities. Crossing that line would not only
wipe out all the protections that would otherwise be available to civilians, but also
expose them to criminal prosecution. 169 This subject will be discussed in more
detail in relation to civilian military contractors in Part IV below.
E. Unlawful Per Se
Towards the end of the legality spectrum are categories that are unlawful per
se. Persons classified in these categories are presumed unlawful combatants, and
as such are not entitled to any of the benefits of IHL, and may be prosecuted for
their conduct.170 The most notable categories are spies and mercenaries. These
categories are discussed in turn below.
1. Spies
Although the definition of the term spy is contained in earlier legal
instruments, including the Brussels Declaration of 1874,171 the legal definition of
most current importance is contained in articles 29 - 31 of The Hague Regulations
and article 46 of Additional Protocol I.
The Hague Regulations provide that a person is considered a spy "when,
acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavors to obtain
information in the zone of operation of a belligerent, with the intent of
communicating it to the hostile party."1 72 The most important factor that makes a
person a spy is not the gathering of the information and communication of the
same to the enemy, but the manner of the collection. For example, if the same
information is obtained without false pretences while wearing a military uniform
that would identify the person as belonging to the armed forces of the opposing
party, that person is not considered a spy.
167. Id.
168. Id. art. 51(3).
169. See DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 29-30.
170. Id. at 31.
171. See The Brussels Declaration, art. 19, cited in Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants,
in FLECK, supra note 5, at 111.
172. Hague II, supra note 98, art. 29.
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This principle is also contained in article 46 of Additional Protocol I. It
states:
A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf
of that Party and in territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or
attempts to gather information shall not be considered as engaging in
espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces. 173
If the same soldier wears a disguise, penetrates into the enemy territory, and
collects information, he would be considered a spy.174 The same applies to
civilians accompanying the armed forces.175  This classification is important
because spies are not only denied prisoner of war status but are also considered
criminals and may be prosecuted and punished for their espionage and related
crimes.176
This is yet another clear demonstration of the importance of the identification
of the exact status of any individuals involved and affected by situations of armed
conflict. Of course, with the advancement of sophisticated military surveillance
equipment, the workability of this traditional definition of a spy might be
problematic. This issue is discussed in some detail in relation to the military
intelligence gathering roles of private military contractors in Part IV below.
2. Mercenaries
The most important unlawful per se category is perhaps mercenaries.
Mercenaries are unlawful combatants who are denied combatant and prisoner of
war status.177 The definition of the term mercenary of most current importance is
contained in article 47 of Additional Protocol 1. It provides that:
A mercenary is a person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in hostilities;
173. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 46(2). The unlawfulness of wearing the enemy's
uniform or other forms of clothing for purposes of disguise in military operations has always been a
subject of controversy. For a brief discussion of this controversy and the compromise that the existing
rules make, see Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in FLECK, supra note 5, at 108 ("It shall
be lawful for combatants recognizable as such (by their uniforms, insignia etc.) to participate in raids,
acts of sabotage, and other attacks carried out by special forces in the enemy's hinterland or in forward
areas. Combatants who commit such acts wearing plain clothes or the uniform of the adversary are
liable to be punished. They shall nevertheless have the right to a regular judicial procedure."
174. See Hague II, supra note 98, art. 29. According to Hague II, those who are not considered
spies include:
Soldiers and civilians, carrying out their mission openly, entrusted with the
delivery of dispatches intended either for their own army or for the enemy's
army. To this class belong likewise persons sent in balloons for the purpose of
carrying dispatches and, generally, of maintaining communications between the
different parts of an army or a territory. Id.
175. See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Noncombatants, in FLECK, supra note 5, at 99.
176. See Hague II, supra note 98, arts. 29. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 46.
177. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 47(1) ("A mercenary shall not have a right to be a
combatant or a prisoner of war.").
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(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised
or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces
of that party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict
on official duty as a member of its armed forces.178
Anyone meeting these requirements is considered an unlawful combatant.
Mercenaries have always been a disfavored category of fighters. Professor Ipsen
suggests that the codification of this particular rule in the Additional Protocol I
"can be explained by the crucial and fatal role which mercenaries - especially of
European and North American origin - have played in armed conflicts on the
African continent."1 79  The exclusion of mercenaries, apart from the practical
undesirable roles they have historically played, rests on the fundamental
assumption that only disciplined forces of a party to the conflict are authorized to
engage in armed conflict with a primary status of lawful combatants. Professor
Ipsen neatly summarizes this notion as follows:
First and foremost it is the person belonging to the armed forces of a
party to the conflict who has the primary status of combatant. This
assignment to an organ constitutes authorization to carry out armed acts
causing harm. A simple contract between an individual and a party to
the conflict - fighting in exchange for payment - is not sufficient. Thus
the rule regarding mercenaries does not amount to an exception but
represents a logical consequence of the law: a person who is not a
member of the armed forces is not (with the exception of participants in
a levie en masse) a combatant either.18 0
Engaging in harmful conduct for monetary compensation is not authorized
and recognized as legitimate conduct under IHL. Persons who meet the above
requirements are thus considered to have engaged in criminal enterprise and may
be prosecuted for their crimes.181  Commentators note that this is an extremely
narrow definition of mercenaries because all six requirements need to be met
cumulatively. 182 The definition is so narrow that it promoted a commentator to
178. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 47.
179. See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Noncombatants, in FLECK, supra note 5, at 69. ("Because
of the prevalence of mercenary activities in post-colonial Africa, in 1972, the Organization of African
Unity adopted The African Mercenary Convention."); OAU Convention for the Elimination of
Mercenaries in Africa, entered into force Apr. 22, 1985, O.A.U. Doc. CM/433/Rev. L. Annex. 1 (1972).
The convention criminalizes different levels of participation in mercenary activities. See, e.g., id. art.
1(2). It also creates state responsibility. See, e.g., id. art. 5.
180. See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Noncombatants, in FLECK, supra note 5, at 69.
181. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 52.
182. See, e.g., id at 50-52.
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suggest "any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves
to be shot - and his lawyer with him."18 3
Perhaps as a result of the narrowness of the definition, in 1989, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted an international convention pertaining to
mercenaries, which eliminated the active participation requirement of the
definition of Protocol I quoted above.18 4 This category is discussed in more detail
in relation to private military contractors in Part IV below.
F. The Status ofParties in Non-international Armed Conflict
Finally, it is important to note that the same standards by and large apply in
non-international armed conflicts. Although advocacy for the application of
civilized rules of warfare in civil war situations dates back many centuries, 185 it
was not until the mid-twentieth century that international treaties dealing with
situations of armed conflict began to provide formal rules applicable in non-
international armed conflict.186 That is not to say that there were not historical
instances where customary rules of humanitarian law applied in domestic conflicts.
Historically, the principle of recognition of belligerents within a given state often
prompted the application of some of the same rules that were applicable in
international armed conflict situations.18 7  However, a transformative step was
taken when Common Article 3 was incorporated into the Geneva Conventions of
1949.188 That essentially brought conflicts of a non-intemational nature within the
ambit of IHL. Therefore, the same principles discussed in the preceding
subsections of Part III now generally apply in non-international armed conflicts.
More important for purposes of this article is the application of some of the
same principles for the identification of parties to the conflict. For example,
prisoner of war status in an armed conflict, whether it is of an international or non-
international nature, is limited to those members of a party to the conflict, which
meet the following criteria:
183. See Christopher Weigley, The Privatization of Violence: New Mercenaries and the State, 1,
available at http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/government/mercenaries-1999.php (last visited June
15, 2007) (quoting Geoffrey Best in DAVID SHEARER, PRIVATE ARIES AND MILITARY INTERVENTION
18(1998)).
184. See id. See also The International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and
Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 34, at 590, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc.
A/44/43 (1989), art. 1 [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries] (omitting the direct
participation in hostilities part of the definition of mercenaries under Additional Protocol I, art. 47).
185. Writing in 1758, Vattel, for example, suggested that "it was perfectly clear that the
establishment of law of war, those principles of humanity, forbearance, truthfulness, and honor, which
we have earlier laid down, should be observed on both sides in a civil war," ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra
note 3, at 22 (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS: OU PRINCIPES DE LA Lol
NATURELLE, APPLIQUtS, A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DE NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS 338
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758).
186. See ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 22.
187. See id. at 23.
188. See id at 24; see also the Four Geneva Conventions, supra note 3, common art. 3
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a. that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
b. that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
c. that of carrying arms openly; and
d. that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.189
As discussed in the previous section, members of the armed forces of a state
are ipso facto entitled to combatant status and subsequently prisoner of war status
unless of course they try to confuse the enemy. Other members of a party to the
conflict should meet all the above requirements cumulatively. This will be
discussed more fully in relation to the functions of private military contractors in
Part IV below.
IV. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS
Part III offered a lengthy discussion of almost all of the possible statuses of
individuals and groups under IHL. Some are lawful statuses such as combatants
and civilians accompanying them. Others are unlawful statuses such as spies,
mercenaries and civilians who engage in combat activities without authorization.
Part IV tackles the following question: under which one of the above categories do
private military contractors fall? To answer this question and characterize the
status of private military contractors under IHL, Part IV discusses the typical and
known activities of the private military contractors in a continuum vis-A-vis the
various legal statuses discussed above.
A. Definition and Background
On December 11, 2003, BBC World News contained the following report:
A private UK-based military firm says it is looking for an investor to
fund an operation to seize indicted former Liberian President Charles
Taylor. Mr. Taylor, who has been granted asylum in Nigeria, is wanted
by the UN-backed court on war crimes charges. Northbridge Services
Group says it has people ready to kidnap Mr. Taylor to claim a $2m
reward allegedly offered by the United States Congress. Washington
has said it opposes any violent action to seize Mr. Taylor. "Any
potential investors that are interested in going in together in this
operation, we would be willing to split the profits," Northbridge
Services Group's director Pasquale Dipofi told the BBC's World Today
190programme.
This report is remarkable not only because it is an explicit admission of the
privatized use of military force for profit, but also the manner of its reporting
makes it seem like any ordinary business transaction.
189. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4(2).
190. Military Firm Seeks Taylor Bounty, BBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2003, available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3309203.stn.
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Dr. Peter W. Singer of the Brookings Institute reported that in 1996 he met
members of Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a Virgina-
based private military company, somewhere in Bosnia where the company was
conducting training of the Bosnian military. 191 He expressed his first impression in
the preface of his seminal work, Corporate Warriors, in the following terms:
The members of the firm were polite and generally helpful, but the ambiguity
between who they were and what they were doing always hung in the air. They
were employees of a private company, but were performing tasks inherently
military. It just did not settle with the way we tended to understand whether
business or warfare. 192
No authoritative definition of Private Military Firms could be found. Dr.
Singer offers a fairly broad definition of these firms as "business organizations that
trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare. They are corporate
bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills, including combat
operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support,
training and technical skills."1 93 As a matter of fact, by estimates of the American
Bar Association, about 30,000 private contractors now provide various services
including security services in Iraq. 194 The following subsections assess the legality
of the various functions of these entities vis-A-vis IHL.
B. Functions and Categories
As indicated above, private military contractors undertake a variety of
functions. While some of these functions would give them clear lawful status
under IHL, some functions would put them in questionable status. Still other
functions towards the opposite end of the legality spectrum would put them
completely at odds with the law. The following subsections discuss the various
functions and possible statuses.
1. Non-combat functions
The continuum begins with purely and uncontrovertibly civilian functions.
An excellent demonstration of the various functions performed by private military
191. See CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at vii.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 8.
194. See Chris Lombardi, Law Curbs Contractors in Iraq, 3 A.B.A.J.E-Rep., May 14, 2004, cited
in Peters, supra note 29, at 382 n.59. If reconstruction and oil workers are added, the figure would
jump to about 50,000 to 75,000. See Max Boot, Commentary, The Iraq War's Outsourcing Snafu, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at B13 (cited in id). In fact, the New York Times recently reported that up to
126,000 American, Iraqi, and other nationals now work for the U.S. government in Iraq. James Risen,
Back from Iraq, Contractors Face Combat-Related Stress, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2007, at Al. The report
also indicated that since the Iraq war began, about 1,000 civilian contractors were killed, and 13,000 of
them were injured. Id. In fact, they are exposed to the same kinds of danger that military personnel are
exposed to, including post traumatic distress disorder after they return home. Id. See Steve Fainaru,
Ambush in Iraq Last Fall Left 4 Americans Missing and a String of Questions About Company they
Worked for, WASH. POST, July 29, 2007. One member of the civilian contacts in Iraq described his
duties as: "We protect the military. Isn't that mind-boggling? ... And I'm taking about escorting
soldiers, as well. Isn't that frightening?" Id.
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contractors is contained in Lockheed Martin's list of "products" that it offers to
customers. The products are listed under thirteen headings: Air Power, Air Traffic
& Transportation Management, Distribution Systems, Homeland Security,
Information Superiority, Information Technology, Missiles & Missile Defense,
Net-Centric Solutions, Space Systems & Technologies, Surveillance, Radar & Fire
Control, Technical Support Services, Technology Research, Training &
Simulation.1 95
One of the subcategories under "Air Power" capability is "combat"
capability. 19 6 Lockheed Martin describes its "combat" capability as follows:
Lockheed Martin's tactical aircraft respond decisively to the evolving
and complex demands of modem combat situations. Our aircraft are the
most versatile fighters in the world, excelling even in the most
demanding of multi-role missions. We have a proven lineage of air
power dominance, from the experienced F-16, to the F-22, and F-35
next-generation fighters. These aircraft were bom through research and
development efforts underscored by a relentless pursuit of new advances
in technology and low-cost, innovative manufacturing methods.
Through a work ethic dedicated to quality, Lockheed Martin provides
unparalleled design, development production and full systems support
of fighter/attack aircraft. For this reason, our fighters dominate the skies
of the world, extending strong, enduring international defense
partnerships. The next generation of high-performance combat aircraft
will continue to push the envelope further - with design concepts that
expand the definition of multi-role aircraft and mission flexibility. We
develop future technology for implementation today, including stealth
capability, precision weapons delivery, battlespace interoperability and
systems compatibility. Through these endeavors, Lockheed Martin's
fighter aircraft will continue as a dominating force behind national
defense and global security. 197
Existing and prospective consumers of these produces include: Air Force,
Army, Asia/Pacific, Defense Agencies, Department of Defense, Department of
Homeland Security, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Marine Corps, NASA, Navy,
Republic of Korea, Special Operations Command.198 Although some policy issues
may be raised as to the desirability of the involvement of private companies in
some of these activities, 199 Lockheed Martin's involvement in the development of
195. Lockheed Martin, Capabilities, available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/capabilities/
(last visited 5 Feb., 2010).
196. Lockheed Martin, Air Power, available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/capabilities/air
power/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Air Power].
197. Id.
198. Lockheed Martin, Customers, available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/customers (last
visited Feb. 5, 2010).
199. In relation to the public-private dilemma, P.W. Singer writes:
The division of the world into public and private spheres is at the center of the
long debate over what government's role should be. Ever since the rule by kings
392 VOL. 3 8:3
STATUS OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS
military technology including the advancement of weaponry and the selling of
such weaponry to the above listed consumers does not ordinarily trigger the
applicability of IHL.2 0 0  However, it gets trickier when the provision of such
products is accompanied by the provision of services such as training, supply, and
maintenance of military equipment in the field. It starts to slowly march into the
gray area. The following section discusses such ambiguous functions.
2. Ambiguous functions (intelligence, training, equipment transportation,
maintenance, interrogation, base construction, protection of civilians)
Training could be one ambiguous function depending on where and how it is
conducted. For example, Lockheed Martin, advertises its training capability as
follows:
The customer's need for readiness is our business. Flight crews and
maintainers must move from training to the real world without
hesitation. To meet this need, Lockheed Martin's end-to-end training
solutions provide experience in the live, virtual, and constructive
domains. Lockheed Martin offers an integrated approach to delivering
total training solutions, creating products that meet specific customer
needs. Our flight and maintenance training systems are world leaders in
training large, widely dispersed student populations operating diverse
fleets of aircraft. Lockheed Martin's proven instructional systems
development, systems engineering, and logistics processes are coupled
with our corporation's intimate knowledge of current aircraft platforms
to ensure a real-world experience in training.201
Another well-known civilian military contactor, MPRI, provides the
following services: "MPRI personnel supplement Region operations across the
entire spectrum of activities to include personnel, training, mobilization, logistics,
force protection, airfield operations, transportation operations, food service,
ammunition management, engineering, environmental operations and human
resources."202
If a couple of air force military officers from India come to Bethesda,
Maryland and receive training as to how to fly and use Lockheed Martin's next
generation F-35 and purchase a few of these aircraft and take them with them to
India, no recognizable issues of IHL would arise. However, consider the following
was replaced by the bureaucratic state in the seventeenth century, there has been
a give-and-take between the public and the private, with the line between the two
constantly in flux. In fact, the debate about where this line should fall has been
described as one of the "grand dichotomies of western political thought."
CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 7.
200. But see Richard T. De George, Non-Combatant Immunity in an Age of High Tech Warfare, in
INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE, supra note 81, at 30 1-10 (discussing the issue of a possible
IHL duty on the part of weapons designers to make weapons smarter with a view to mitigating
unnecessary injury and damage).
201. Air Power, supra note 196.
202. MPRI, Staff Augmentation, available at http://www.mpri.conVmain/recruitingaugmentation.
html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
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scenario. The training takes place in India close to the Kashmir border. Pakistan
shoots down one of the training aircraft and the two states get into a small-scale
armed conflict. Assume further that Pakistan captures three occupants of the
aircraft that was shot down: two Indian trainees and one Lockheed Martin trainer.
Would all of them be considered lawful combatants and as a result entitled to
prisoner of war status?
This is not as farfetched as it might sound. Consider the following real story.
In 1999, when genocide was looming in Kosovo, NATO forces conducted an air
attack against the Milosevic government. 203 These attacks produced thousands of
204refugees and created humanitarian emergencies. Because the involvement of the
United States in this conflict was not popular, the administration chose to involve
the Texas-based private military contractor Brown & Roots (KBR).205  The
company performed the following activities with efficiency: constructed temporary
facilities on the ground that housed thousands of displaced persons from Kosovo;
ran the supply system for U.S. forces in the area, including transportation of food
and other supplies; constructed bases; and maintained vehicles and weaponry.206
Given the circumstances described above, there was a real possibility that
Milosevic's forces could have attacked one of the bases and captured some of
KBR's personnel while maintaining some of the military equipment or transporting
some of the equipment and weaponry. Had this occurred, what would have been
their status under IHL? Would they have been entitled to prisoner of war status?
Would they have had combatant status or would they have just been persons
accompanying the armed forces? Or would they even be considered mercenaries?
Because this fact pattern would help demonstrate the ambiguity in the status of
these personnel, it is important to test the facts against the rules described in Part
III above.
Assume further that some members of the company were armed with
weapons for their own protection and used the weapons to kill some members of
Milosevic's army before they were captured. The first question that needs to be
asked is whether they would be entitled to combatant status. In other words, may
they be prosecuted for killing Milosevic's soldiers? As discussed in Part III above,
combatant status may only be acquired if the following requirements are
cumulatively met: membership to the armed forces of a party to the conflict with
identifiable uniforms and emblems, the presence of a chain of command wherein
officers are responsible for their subordinates, the existence of internal discipline,
and respect for international law relating to warfare.207
203. CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 6.
204. Id.
205. Id. Better known as KBR, it is a leading engineering and construction firm. See generally
KBR, http://www.kbr.com/ (last visited June 26, 2007) (describing the KBR "as the largest contractor
for the United States Army and a top-ten contractor for the U.S. Department of Defense, it is currently
the world's largest defense services provider").
206. See CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 6.
207. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43.
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The party to the conflict in this case was NATO. All members of the U.S.
military would evidently qualify as members of the party to the conflict by virtue
of the membership of the U.S. in NATO. Members of KBR were evidently not
sworn members of the U.S. military and as such did not qualify as members of the
NATO forces, which was one of the only two parties to the conflict; the second
being Milosevic's army. If they were not members of a party to the conflict,
subject to the chain of command and discipline, then they cannot be considered
lawful combatants. The relationship between the firm and the U.S. military is
purely contractual. Although the details of the contracts are confidential, 208 it is
fair to assume that the contract does not require members of the firm to take an
oath similar to the one that members of the military take, or otherwise incorporate
them as de jure members. As will be discussed below, the U.S. had actually
negotiated immunity for members of the defense forces as well as contractors
operating in Iraq,209 but in the absence of such immunity, they risk exposure to
prosecution as unlawful combatants. More particularly because the lex specialis in
the instant example is IHL, members of KBR may theoretically be prosecuted for
killing Milosevic's soldiers. It is important to reemphasize here that killing in
combat requires legal authorization. Anyone who kills an enemy solider without
authorization lacks immunity from prosecution.
Could such members of KBR claim the status of civilians or non-combatants
accompanying the armed forces and avoid prosecution? To be considered civilians
accompanying the armed forces and claim prisoner of war status, they must belong
to one of the following categories: medical and religious workers, 2 10 Civilian
members of aircraft crew, war correspondents, supply contractors, or members of
labor units.21' Moreover, persons claiming civilian status must first be authorized
to undertake their civilian activities by the party to the conflict and carry an
208. Copies of these kinds of contracts are not publicly available. For a copy of an example of a
private military contract outside the U.S., see CORPORATE WARRIORS, note 23, at 245, appendix 2
(providing a copy of the contract between private sector firm, Sandline, and the government of Papua
New Guinea). This contract was signed between the now defunct military firm, Sandline International,
and the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Among the responsibilities undertaken under the
contract were to "gather intelligence to support effective deployment and operations; conduct offensive
operations in Bougainville in conjunction with PNG . . ." See id. at Prmble. The PNG agreed to pay
$36,000,000 for these services. See id. at 251, appendix 2, Fees and Payments. Despite allegations of
illegality, an international tribunal enforced this contract. See Sandline Int'l Inc. v. Papua N.G., 117
I.L.R. 552 (Arb. Tribunal 1998). For commentary on the nature of the contracts and how they may be
used to ensure accountability, see Laura A. Dickinson, Torture and Contract, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 267, 273-74 (2006) [hereinafter Torture and Contract].
209. See The Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 17 (Revised), Status of the Coalition
Provisional Authority, MNF - Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, Sec. 2, Iraqi Legal Process,
available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG-1_TheCoalitionProvisi
onalAuthority_.pdf ("Unless provided otherwise herein, the MNF, the CPA, Foreign Liaison Missions,
their Personnel, property, funds and assets, and all International Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi
legal process.").
210. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43(2). See also Geneva Convention III, supra
note 3, art. 33.
211. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4(A)(4).
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identity card similar to the one reproduced in Part 111(d) above.212 They must
properly identify themselves as civilians in that card.213 Whether they could claim
immunity as civilians accompanying the armed forces depends not only on their
belonging to the above categories but also on whether their activities could be
considered as taking direct part in hostilities214 or causing harmful acts to the
enemy.215
Presumably, members of KBR in the instant example could qualify as supply
contractors with authorization to function as such in a combat zone. It could also
be presumed that they could carry light weapons for their own protection or for the
protection of other civilians.216 Thus, it is obvious that if they are attacked in the
place where they were performing civilian functions, they could use their light
weapons to protect themselves. If in doing so they kill enemy soldiers and get
captured thereafter, they may be entitled to prisoner of war status and, as such,
immunity from prosecution, provided that their conduct does not rise to the level of
217war crimes. It may nonetheless be argued that conducting training and
maintaining weaponry near combat areas is taking direct part in hostilities which
rescinds civilian status under article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I. It could further
be argued that even if training and maintenance of weaponry do not qualify as
taking direct part in hostilities depending on where and when they take place, these
activities could possibly be considered as acts that cause harm to the enemy under
the rationale of article 13 of Additional Protocol I.
The two other categories that could raise some ambiguities are mercenaries
and spies. In the above example, would members of KBR qualify as mercenaries?
Mercenary is a carefully defined legal term. As discussed in Part III(e)(ii) above,
the essential requirements include special recruitment for combat, taking a direct
part in hostilities for excessive private gain, and alienage.218 Under the definition
of a mercenary, all of the essential requirements must be met cumulatively.219 In
other words, if any one of the above requirements is not present, the actors are not
considered mercenaries. In the above example, it cannot be said that members of
KBR were specifically recruited for combat. As such, they cannot be considered
mercenaries. Whether they meet the remaining requirements could be disputed.
For example, more facts would be needed to determine the excess in payment or
the nationality of each involved individual member of the team. The requirement
of whether they took a direct part in hostilities may also be disputed. Although
212. See id. 4(A)(4).
213. See supra Model Identity Card, reproduced in Part III(D).
214. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(3).
215. See id. at art. 13.
216. See id at art. 13(2)(a). Although this provision deals with medical personnel, it may
reasonably be assumed that the same standards would apply to other civilian contractors.
217. This argument is based on the rules that regulate the situations of medical personnel who are
inherently civilian. It appears, however, that the same principles would apply to other civilians. See
Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 13(1)-(2).
218. See Additional Protocol, supra note 3, art. 47.
219. See id
396 VOL. 3 8:3
2010 STATUS OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS 397
they do not meet the requirements of mercenary, the ambiguity in their status
remains.
The last category that needs to be discussed in this subsection is the spy
category. Because intelligence gathering is an important function of private
military contractors, it is necessary to understand their status in this regard. For
example, Lockheed Martin advertises its intelligence capabilities as follows:
From the depths of the oceans to the far reaches of space, we serve the
Department of Defense and the intelligence community with leading-
edge intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems for
maritime, terrestrial, airborne, and space missions. Lockheed Martin is
a leader in satellite imagery and information systems, air surveillance,
radar, geospatial imagery, mission management, and ground system
operations. Our focus is on providing joint and multi-agency
organizations with valuable, effective ISR data for a diverse set of
missions ranging from precision targeting to geographic mapping.220
Nothing makes the performance of these activities illegal, even in times of
war. However, if the information is gathered under false pretenses, the intelligence
gathering would become espionage activity.221 The personnel engaged in the
activity would be considered spies and as such unlawful per se. As a matter of
law, not even members of the armed forces or combatants are immune from such
222
designation, as long as they collect the intelligence under false pretense.
The traditional way of collecting information under false pretense is usually
wearing the enemy's uniforms and infiltrating into enemy held territories. 223 With
the advancement of technology, however, intelligence gathering could be done by
civilians sitting in their offices thousands of miles away from the frontlines. For
example, a civilian contractor sitting in his office in Alexandria, Virginia could
hack into the software of an enemy anywhere and obtain information for the U.S.
military. If the hacker obtains the information under a false pretense, he would
qualify as a spy. 224 If a "cyber-soldier" 225 does the same, he or she would likewise
be considered a spy.226 Such designation could only have significance if the said
220. See Lockheed Martin, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, http://www.lockheed
martin.com/ capabilities/information superiority/ (last visited June 18, 2007).
221. See Hague II, supra note 98, at arts. 29-31; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art.
46.
222. See Hague II, supra note 98, at arts. 29-31; Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 46; see
also supra discussion of spies under Part III(E)(1).
223. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 46(2) (providing: "A member of the armed
forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in the territory controlled by an adverse
Party, gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if,
while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces.").
224. See Hague II, supra note 98, art. 29.
225. This term is borrowed from Professor De George. He provides a brief description of and
commentary on computer hacking from the point of view of situations of warfare. See Richard T. De
George, Non-Combatant Immunity in an Age of High Tech Warfare, in INTERVENTION, TERRORISM,
AND TORTURE 301, 310-13 (Steven P. Lee ed., 2006).
226. See Hague II, supra note 98, art. 29 ("Soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated
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individuals, the civilian or the soldier, fall into the hands of the enemy anytime
thereafter. If that happens, however, the law does not treat the two individuals the
same way.227 While the civilian may be prosecuted for the crime of espionage he
committed in the past, the soldier is immune from such prosecution as long as he
remains a member of the armed forces or rejoins the armed forces after engaging in
the said activities of espionage. In other words, a soldier can be prosecuted as a
spy only if he is caught in the act or before rejoining his unit.228 To the contrary,
once a civilian is a spy, he is always a spy, and may be prosecuted anytime for any
acts of espionage committed anytime regardless of his current status.229
Because of the foregoing, intelligence gathering is also an area of ambiguity
that requires further reflection. Although technology based intelligence gathering
would not ordinarily expose civilian contractors to danger, situations where such
exposure could ensue is foreseeable. One of the KBR employees captured by
Milosevic's army in the example discussed above could easily be an intelligence
analyst who had engaged in cyber intelligence gathering.
The status issue becomes even more complicated when the private military
contractors get involved to protect civilians from irregular forces in situations
where there is no conventional armed conflict. This is similar to the situation in
Iraq. For example, some 800 armed members of one of the largest U.S. based
security firms, Blackwater, currently guard American diplomats in Iraq.23 0 The
State Department rules allow these contractors to use deadly force if the civilians
they are protecting face "imminent and grave danger."231
Because of the obvious difficulty in identifying the exact course of legal
action that needs to be taken in cases where such a standard is not respected, under
the seemingly no war, no peace situations, policy makers still remain perplexed.
To address the issues of the gap in accountability under these circumstances,
into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not
considered spies.").
227. Id. at arts. 29-31.
228. Id.
229. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 46(4):
A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is not a resident of
territory occupied by an adverse Party and who has engaged in espionage in that
territory shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be
treated as a spy unless he is captured before he has rejoined the armed forces to
which he belongs.
It is important to note that the Protocol clearly limits such privilege to members of armed forces.
Compare Hague II, supra note 98, art. 29 ("A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is
subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his
previous acts of espionage.").
230. See Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Pentagon Sees Authority Over Contractors, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/10/17/washington/17blackwater.html [hereinafter Schmitt &
Shanker]. Blackwater was a subject of great media coverage following the fatal shooting of sixteen
Iraqi civilians in Bagdad on September 16, 2007. The company has obtained $1 billion in U.S.
government security contracts since 2001. See Steve Fainaru, How Blackwater Sniper Fire Felled 3
Iraqi Guards, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2007, at AO1 [hereinafter Fainaru].
231. Fainaru, supra note 230, at AO1. As of this report, it had 867 security guards in Iraq. Id.
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understandably, various options are being proposed and considered, although as of
the writing of this article no concrete measures have been taken. One of the
options that is being considered is military supervision of contractors.232 However,
such a proposal cannot address the underlying issue of the applicable law in
holding violators accountable.
The legal uncertainty indeed is the following. As discussed above, U.S.
military, as well as civilian contractors, are immune from the Iraqi legal process.
Moreover, the applicability of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is doubtful
because the civilian contractors mostly provide security service to a civilian
agency, such as the State Department, much like a security guard provides services
for a museum in Atlanta or New York. 233 Of course, trying civilians in military
courts also has its own problems.234 The best option seems to be the prosecution of
civilian contractors under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which
permits the prosecution of civilians accompanying the armed forces. 235 Although
this seems to be a better option, it also does not answer the main question this
article raises - do military contractors qualify as civilians under IHL?
Accordingly, therefore, the ambiguity of the statute remains to be the most serious
legal challenge.
3. Combat Functions
The involvement of private military contractors in actual combat is not a
rhetorical scenario. In recent decades, they have been involved in conventional
inter-state as well as unconventional domestic warfare.236 This subsection provides
examples of real stories where military contractors have played a significant role in
conventional and non-conventional warfare and assesses contractors' status in light
of IHL.
A devastating war commenced between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998,
237along the western boundary between the two countries. Within a short time the
conventional armed hostilities engulfed almost the entire border between the two
232. See John M. Broder & David Johnston, U.S. Military Will Supervise Iraq Security Firms,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/washington/31contractor.html (explaining
the details of this plan); see also Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 230.
233. For example, in 2006, the Uniform Code of Military Justice was amended to cover civilian
contracts "in declared wars or contingency operations." But this amendment does not address the issue
of whether contractors working for civilian agencies would be covered. See Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von
Zielbauer, Blackwater Case Highlights Legal Uncertainties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, www.nytimes
.com/2007/10/1 1/world/middleeast/1 1legal.html.
234. See infra section IV.
235. See id. (citing Scott Horton of Columbia University, a specialist in law of armed conflict).
236. See, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 3-6.
237. See Ethiopia's Jus Ad Bellum Claims, Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission paras. 14, 16
(Dec. 19, 2005); see also Eritrea's Western Front Arial Bombardment and Related Claims, Ethiopia-
Eritrea Claims Commission para. 22 (Dec. 19, 2005); Ethiopia's Western Front Claims, Ethiopia-
Eritrea Claims Commission para. 25 (Dec. 19, 2005); Ethiopia's Central Front Claims, Ethiopia-Eritrea
Claims Commission para. 24 (Apr. 28, 2004); Eritrea's Central Front Claims, Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims
Commission para. 30 (Apr. 28, 2004). All of the partial awards cited hereinabove are available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid= 1151 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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238countries. The two parties ceased their hostilities in June of 2000, pursuant to a
cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Algiers.239  During this war an
estimated 70,000 people were killed.240 In addition to that, Eritrea captured and
interned 1,100 prisoners of war,241 including an air force pilot.242  Ethiopia
captured and interned 2,600 prisoners of war.243 All the prisoners were later
repatriated to their home countries.244 The prisoners of war taken by each party
were nationals of the other, and as such there were no formal claims of
involvement of private military contractors.245 However, the story does not end
there. What was unique about this African war was the involvement of extremely
sophisticated high-tech fighter jets. According to BBC's Patrick Gilkes, in
December 1999, while Ethiopia acquired eight Sukhoi 27 fighters, Eritrea acquired
eight to ten MiG 29 interceptors.246 Most importantly, Gilkes added that "[n]either
side, however, [had] any pilots qualified for the new planes. They [were] being
flown by pilots from Russia, Ukraine or Latvia and both [were] using Russian
technicians for their maintenance."247 At the time, it was widely understood that
the Russian, Ukrainian, or Latvian pilots, mechanics, or advisers were private
248 hrta fmilitary contractors, rather than officials formally representing their respective
governments.249
238. See Ethiopia's Jus AdBellum Claims, Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission para. 19 (Dec. 19,
2005) available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/FINAL%/o20ET20JAB.pdf
239. See Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the State of Eritrea
and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Eri.-Eth., June 18, 2000, 85
U.N.T.S. 2138.
240. See, e.g., Xan Rice, After 70,000 deaths, Eritrea and Ethiopia prepare for war again, THE
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article754553.ece (last visited June
19, 2007).
241. See Ethiopia's Prisoners of War Claim, Ethiopia- Eritrea Claims Commission para. 3 (July 1,
2003), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ET04.pdf (last visited June 19, 2007).
242. See Emma Jane Kirby, Ethiopia, Eritrea to free all PoWs, BBC NEWS, Aug. 23, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2212159.stm (last visited June 19, 2007).
243. See Eritrea's Prisoners of War Claim, Ethiopia - Eritrea Claims Commission para. 3 (July 1,
2003), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ER17.pdf (last visited June 19, 2007).
244. Id.
245. Id. at para. 1; Ethiopia's Prisoners of War Claim, Ethiopia - Eritrea Claims Commission para.
1 (July 1, 2003), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ETO4.pdf (last visited June 19, 2007).
246. See Patrick Gilkes, World: Africa Analysis: Arms pour in for border war, BBC NEWS, Mar. 2,
1999, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/280273.stm (last visited June 19, 2007).
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 11 ("In its war with Eritrea, Ethiopia
leased a wing of jet fighters from Sukhoi firm, along with the pilots to fly them, the mechanics to
maintain them, and the commanders to plan out their attacks.") (citing to numerous sources including:
Charles Smith, Wars and Rumors of War: Russian Mercenaries Flying for Ethiopia: Advisers, Pilots,
Artillerymen Engaged in "Large-scale offensives' against Eritrea, WORLD NET DAILY, (July 18, 2000),
available at http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageld=7158; Thomas Adams, The New
Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict, PARAMETERS, 103-116 (Summer 1999) available at
http://www.usamhi.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/99summer/adams.htm; Russians Fly for both Sides
in Horn of Africa, LONDON TIMES, (Feb. 19, 1999). Sukhoi is a private Russian company. For the
company's profile and holdings philosophy, see Sukhoi, http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/company/ideology/
(last visited June 19, 2007).
249. Indeed, if they were official representatives of their respective governments, they would have
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The involvement of the private contracts in the sale, delivery, and
maintenance of the equipment as well as the training and advising away from the
conflict zones would not have serious legal consequences. However, once the
Sukhoi pilots started flying the aircraft in combat, the legal status becomes
problematic. Although reports have indicated that the pilots were involved in
actual combat, the truth of these allegations has never been officially recognized
by the involved parties. Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of legal argument
that the allegations were true, what would have been the legal status of a Sukhoi
employee captured by Eritrea after being shot down while flying the Su-27 high-
tech fighter jet in combat? Would he have been treated just like one of the 1,100
Ethiopian prisoners of war that Eritrea captured? Would there be a difference in
status between a Sukhoi pilot flying an aircraft for Ethiopia, and a pilot belonging
to the Ethiopian air force? The same questions could be asked about private
contractors that might have flown the MiG-29 fighter jets that Eritrea used against
Ethiopia.
The answer to all of these questions is clear. The Sukhoi or MiG-29 pilots
would not be entitled to prisoner of war status and may be prosecuted by the
detaining party for any death, injury, or damage that they might have caused while
flying in combat even if the targets were legitimate military targets. IHL provides
no combatant immunity for private contractors under these circumstances. 25 0 in
fact, this is a classic example of an unambiguous unlawful combatant status of
private military contractors in conventional inter-state armed conflict.
There are several examples of recent involvement of private military
contractors in non-international armed conflicts. The following two instances are
representative of a much wider role they have played particularly on the African
continent.
In 1991, the government of the West African nation of Sierra Leone, a former
British colony, found itself cornered by a violent rebellion.251 The rebellion, led by
a group called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), brought about untold misery
to the civilian population.252 The movement used child soldiers and admittedly
used unlawful means of warfare, including the deliberate targeting of civilians for
253rape and extermination. A particularly horrific signature of the RUF was the
malicious amputation of civilians' arms regardless of age and gender.254 Within
approximately four years, the RUF gained ground, controlled the economically
vital diamond mines, and continued to perpetrate atrocious acts.255 In 1995, the
a legitimate status provided that they respected the laws and customs of warfare. See, e.g., Additional
Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 47(2)(f) (excepting a person sent on official duty by the government of his
home country from the definition of the term mercenary).
250. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 47(2)(f).
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RUF began advancing towards the capital city, Freetown.256 The government
soldiers began fleeing in disarray and some even joined the RUF.257 As the RUF
closed in on the city, the civilian population was completely engulfed in horror.
Foreign embassies and international organizations evacuated their personnel and
their families, and the situation looked extremely gloomy. 258
However, unexpectedly and inexplicably, an unknown and sophisticated elite
force equipped with precision air and artillery weapons began pounding the
positions of the RUF rebels.2 59  Immediately followed by mechanized infantry
units, this elite force drove the surprised rebels away from Freetown and the mine
fields. 260 The once powerful rebel forces were obliterated. Within a short period
of time, relative peace and security prevailed in Sierra Leone. It was followed by
democratic elections and the prosecution of war criminals. 2 61 The elite ground
forces and pilots that destroyed the rebels and made this possible wore no uniform,
carried no insignia and flew no flags.262 They were employees of a South African
based private military company called Executive Outcomes.263
Although this might be an oversimplification of the character and resolution
of the predicaments that Sierra Leone faced during its civil war and thereafter, 64 it
is a good example of the nature of transactions that private military contractors are
hired to perform. Because this is a purely combat function, the issue that needs to
be considered in this case is whether the members of Executive Outcome were
lawful combatants. Their performance was undoubtedly efficient and desirable.
However, what was their status under IHL? Did they have lawful combatant
status? The answer to this question is simply no because they meet each and every
requirement of Additional Protocol I pertaining to mercenaries.265 To reiterate the
requirements discussed above, a mercenary is a person who meets the following
requirements: special recruitment for armed conflict abroad, taking part in
hostilities for pay in excess of what might be paid for a regular soldier, not a
national of the party to the conflict, and not sent on official duty by the state of
nationality.266
256. Id. at 3-4.
257. Id.
258. Id.





264. Of course, the civil conflict in Sierra Leone involved several actors with different motives,
and as such, the situation was not as simple as Singer's description would suggest. For proper
documentation of the history of the civil war, see Sierra Leone Web, http://www.sierra-
leone.org/history-conflict.html. For more information related to the civil war and the prosecution of
RUF members and other accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, see The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/Default.aspx.
265. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 47.
266. Id.
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In this case, members of Executive Outcomes were specially recruited to fight
in armed conflicts outside of South Africa, presumably for excessive pay.267 They
obviously were not sent by the South African government, which in fact disbanded
them in 1999 following the passage of a law to that effect.268 Despite the rosy
picture that the descriptive paragraph above paints, the negative adverse role that
mercenaries play in conflicts around the world is almost universally recognized.
Mercenaries complicate matters more rather than help resolve them. 269 That is
precisely why their activities remain illegal.
A scenario by which the legal status of a fighter affiliated with Executive
Outcomes captured by RUF might seem meaningless as he would likely be shot
instantly by his captors before the question even arises. However, the legal status
of the captured individual would certainly affect the status of those RUF members
who captured him when they have to answer to criminal charges. For example, it
is not inconceivable that an RUF member who is on trial now before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone might defend against charges of murdering a member of a
private military contractor by saying that the killing was justified because the
civilian contractor was an unlawful combatant. Of course, he would then be asked
if the killing was performed pursuant to a death sentence after a proper trial as
required by IHL. He may not have a good answer for that, but at least the crime
may not be as severe as killing a prisoner of war.
The lawful status of combatants is never unimportant, particularly when there
is some sort of post-conflict justice, because only a lawful combatant status
justifies the killing of another human being. Obviously, the importance of legal
status increases as the level of lawlessness decreases. The following example
demonstrates an increased level of importance relating to another African civil
war.
Just about the same time when Executive Outcomes was involved in the
Sierra Leone conflict, Mobutu Sese Seko, the former ruler of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), then called Zaire, sought assistance from private
military contractors to salvage his authority which was being increasingly
267. Executive Outcomes' involvement in several civil conflicts in Africa has been reported. See
Military Intelligence, Professional Bulletin, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/tradoc/usaic/mipb/
1999-3/brooks.htm. It advertised its services as: "Military Training, advice and support services. Para-
Military Services. Peacekeeping Services. Special Security Services." See Executive Outcomes,
Mission & Services, http://web.archive.org/web/19981205202613 /www.eo.com/miserv/miserv2.html
(last visited June 19, 2007).
268. Executive Outcomes was dissolved in January 1999 when South Africa enacted the
Regulations of Foreign Military Assistance Act. See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, Bill
54D-97 (GA), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=71747 [hereinafter
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill].
269. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and its
Application to Peoples under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, Report on the
Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impending the Exercise
of the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/23 (Jan. 12, 1994) (providing
that mercenaries "tend to increase the violent and cruel nature of specific aspects of the armed conflict
in which they are involved").
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threatened by rebellion.270 Although Executive Outcomes and MPRI declined his
request, as they considered his situation hopeless, another firm known as Geolink
got involved in the conflict to assist him.271
The leader of the rebellion, Laurent Kabila, finally took over government
272power, reportedly with some assistance from another private company.2 When
Kabila was in turn threatened by a coalition of forces, which included the national
militaries of Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, he hired Executive Outcomes for
military support.273 His adversaries also hired private military contractors
including the South Africa based Stabilco and Avient for air combat support.274
This complex situation demonstrates a number of different scenarios. The
situations that could have or might have happened include the following: the
capture by Sese Seko forces of one or more of the private personnel aiding Kabila;
the capture by national armed forces of the DRC (after Kabila's take over) of
Stabilco or Avient personnel fighting on behalf of Uganda, Rwanda, or Zimbabwe;
and finally the capture by the national armed forces of any one of the three nations
of Executive Outcomes' personnel fighting for Kabila. In all of the above
examples, the captors would be sovereign governments with national armed forces
who could, if they choose, put the captured on trial for unlawful combatancy.
Additionally, in all of these examples, almost invariably, the private military
contractors qualify as mercenaries under the narrow definition of article 47 of
Protocol I discussed at length above.
In conclusion, it appears that the provision of combat services by private
military contractors is almost always illegal. As such, it would put involved
personnel at risk of being prosecuted for their participation as well as any injury,
death, or damage they might cause, regardless of the legitimacy of the military
objectives.
C. Responsibility
The preceding subsections of this part attempted to put the various activities
of private military contractors in a legal continuum. The continuum shows that
while some activities are perfectly legitimate, others are either ambiguous or
outright illegitimate. The discussion in these subsections was limited to the
identification of the possibility of prosecution for the illegitimate activities
whenever the actors fall into the hands of the governments or other entities against
which they fight. The following section looks at the status of private military
contractors from the perspective of the states that host, employ, and deploy them.
270. See CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 10.
271. Id. Singer notes that this company might have been a cover for the French intelligence rather
than an independent private firm, citing O'Brien, Military Advisory Groups and African Security (does
not provide citation). This would, of course, change the entire status analysis pertaining only to this
particular entity because if there is government involvement, the status of the personnel involved would
be different.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 11.
274. Id.
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It also examines the responsibilities of these states under international law, and sets
the stage for the concluding analysis.
1. Private Military Contractors' Accountability
Two general forms of accountability could be envisaged: individual criminal
responsibility and company civil liability. Both of these options are briefly
discussed in turn.
a. Individual Criminal Responsibility
Holding members of private military contractors criminally responsible in the
states that host them, and employ their services could be very problematic. A
practical example that can demonstrate the difficulty with this regard is the widely
publicized Abu Ghraib situation.275
Private military contractors were involved in the abuses along with uniformed
U.S. military personnel. 276 The abuses clearly constituted criminal acts. While
several military personnel involved in the abuses were prosecuted, convicted, and
sentenced to up to ten years in prison, no criminal prosecution was made against
the civilian contractors who were equally responsible for the crimes. 2 78  That is
primarily because of the very difficult nature of the status of the private actors
under conflict situations. 279  The forum to hold them responsible is simply not
easily available. Understandably, the military personnel were held accountable
before courts-martial. The jurisdiction of the courts-martial did not, however,
extend to the trial of private individuals accompanying the armed forces in this
case. 280 The reason for this is complex, and this article does not attempt to provide
a detailed analysis of the jurisprudence in that area. 81
However, it is important to briefly point out that the U.S. has an elaborate
statutory framework for the prosecution in U.S. federal courts of private
contractors who commit criminal conduct abroad.282 The most notable statutes are
275. For a comprehensive discussion of the Abu Ghraib situation, see generally Major General
Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (2004) available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-law.htm#abu ghraib (last visited June 20, 2007).
276. See also Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, Unchecked, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2004, at Al5.
277. See MSNBC, England Sentenced to 3 Years, Sept. 28, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/9492624/ (last visited June 20, 2007). See also CNN, Sentencing Phase Begins in Abu
Ghraib, May 3, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/05/02/ england.plea/index.html (last
visited June 20, 2007); see also Eric Schmitt, Iraq Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower Ranks, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23 2006, at Al (quoting a military spokesperson as saying a total of 251 military personnel
had received varying levels of punishment for prisoner abuse); see also Josh White, Conflicting
Portraits of Officer Charged Over Abu Ghraib, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at A03.
278. See P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 127, cited in
Peters, supra note 29, at 367. Since then, some contractors were prosecuted for contract fraud, which
had nothing to do with the abuses. See id. at n. 1.
279. See id. at 126-127 (discussing legal dilemmas).
280. Uniform Code of Military Justice, § 802, art. 2.
281. For a thorough discussion of the jurisdictional issue, see generally Peters, supra note 29.
282. Jennifer K. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR CONGRESS, Jan. 7, 2010.
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the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MFJA),283 the Special Maritime and
Territorial Jurisdiction Act (SMTJ),284 and the War Crimes Act (WCA).285
Therefore, individual criminal responsibility, at least from the perspective of the
U.S., could theoretically be pursued in regular federal courts if desired.286 Federal
courts do not seem to be convenient forums for practical reasons unrelated to the
issue of jurisdiction.287 What would have been the most appropriate and
convenient forum, one that has tried the cases of the uniformed personnel, the
military court system, is simply not available for cases involving civilian
contractors in the absence of a declared war.288 This is another important reason
for the proper definition of their status under IHL and the regulation of their
conduct under the domestic laws of the states that host them and employ their
services.
b. Company Civil Liability
Civil liability is perhaps more complicated than holding wrongdoers
criminally responsible. In the U.S., there are limited avenues that victims may
explore. One of the possibilities is a civil suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA").28 9 ATCA grants federal courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 2 90 There are several seeming obstacles to prevailing in a civil suit
against a private military contractor under the ATCA. Three major obstacles can
easily be identified.
283. Codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3261-3267 (2000).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
285. Codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
286. For example, the SMTJ gives federal courts jurisdiction for conducts that occur outside of the
U.S. but in facilities run by the U.S. government. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 as amended by USA Patriot Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. VIII, § 894, 115 Stat. 272, 377 (2001).
287. For various reasons, including political, this option does not seem to have been considered
seriously and pursued as it could have been. In fact, there was only one prosecution related to prisoner
abuse by civilian contractors in Iraq or Afghanistan. See Jaime Jansen, Federal Trial Begins for CIA
Contractor Charged with Afghan Detainee Abuse, JURIST LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Aug. 7, 2006,
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/08/federal-trial-begins-for-cia.php (last visited
June 22, 2007). In an interesting departure from previous practice, five Blackwater Guards were
charged with fourteen counts of manslaughter on December 8, 2008, for their roles in the Nisoor Square
incidents that occurred on September 16, 2007, during which fourteen Iraqi civilians were killed. See
Ginger Thompson & James Risen, Plea by Blackwater Guard Helps Indict Others, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/washington/09blackwater.html. This case is
likely to raise serious jurisdictional controversy.
288. See United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363 (1970) (cert. denied.) In Averette, the
United States Court of Military Appeals held that the term "in times of war" in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C §. 802(a)(10), limits the federal courts' jurisdiction to conduct occurring in
declared wars. See id at 365. See also Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248
(1960) (holding that military jurisdiction did not extend to civilian dependents of military personnel in
peace time); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1957) (holding that civilians in times of peace
may not be tried by courts-martial).
289. Also called the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
290. Id.
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The first obstacle is of course overcoming the Supreme Court's strict
interpretation of the substantive limits of the ATCA in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.29 1
In Sosa, the Supreme Court, while recognizing that the ATCA is a jurisdictional
statue, raised the standard for the severity of the injury that must be alleged as a
violation of "the law of nations."292 The Court held that the nature of the violation
must be such that it is universally recognized as seriously injurious. 293  To
demonstrate the level of seriousness, the Court borrowed language from several
courts of appeals. For example, it quoted the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
for the proposition that section 1350 of the ATCA applies when the violations
must be "a handful of heinous actions - each of which violates definable, universal
and obligatory norms." 294 It also relied on the holding of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which said that "[f]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has
become - like the pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind."295  Given the strict limitation of the ATCA to hostis
humani generis, any private action against private military contractors would
recognizably be very difficult. There are a few pending cases brought by victims
of Abu Ghraib abuses against involved private military companies under the
ATCA.296 Given the current debate about the meaning of torture, it remains to be
seen in the few cases that are now pending, whether the courts will hold that the
abuses met the standards that the Supreme Court set in Sosa.
The second obstacle is establishing a government connection. International
obligations are often defined in terms of government accountability. For example,
under the Convention Against Torture,297 acts of torture may only give rise to
liability if they are committed by a public official or at the acquiescence of a public
official.298 Consequently, to prevail under ATCA, the claimant must establish that
the law of nations has been violated, and prove that there was a nexus between the
injury and government conduct.299
Wherever private military contractors are involved, establishing a government
nexus could be very difficult. For example, would private contractors hired by the
Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) be considered to have been hired by
the U.S. government or an Iraqi government? Or was the CPA a government at
all? If the CPA is not a government, it would mean that there is no civil liability
for private military contractors under the circumstances.
291. Alvarez v. Sosa, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
292. See id. at 735.
293. Id.
294. Id. (quoting Tel-oren v. Libya Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
295. Id. (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cit. 1980)).
296. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436
F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006).
297. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984). See also Foreign Affairs and
Restructuring Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277.
298. G.A. Res. 39/46, supra note 297, art. 1.
299. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
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These arguments are not hypothetical. For example, in a case against private
contractor Custer Battles LLC for fraud under the False Claims Act, a U.S. federal
judge set aside a jury verdict holding the company responsible for $10 million
precisely because of the ambiguous nature of the status of the CPA during the
initial years of the Iraqi invasion.300 The only issue in this case was the status of
the CPA as a government entity and its relations with the U.S.301 The government
argued that fraudulent bills presented to the CPA could be considered to have been
presented to the government of the United States because the CPA was created and
financed by the United States to run Iraq and staffed by American personnel.302
However, despite this, the court held that the CPA was an international entity with
an ambiguous status but may not be considered a part of the United States
government.03 As such, the fraudulent documents submitted to the CPA cannot be
considered to have been submitted to the United States.304 That meant that the
private contractor was not held responsible for the fraudulent behavior despite a
jury verdict determining the existence of fraudulent activities.0 5 Because this was
the first test case, the ruling obviously rendered the dozens of others that were
ready to be filed306 void ab inito, at least from the point of view of this particular
basis of jurisdiction.
Another example that demonstrates the obstacles that the private-government
distinction might create is the D.C. Circuit's June 2006 preliminary decision in
Saleh v. Titan Corp.3 07 In Saleh, several Iraqi nationals brought an action under
the ATCA against the Titan Corporation, a private military contractor which
provided interrogation and translation services in Iraq.308 They alleged that Titan's
personnel abused the claimants in violation of the law of nations.309 The court
essentially held that the claimants did not sufficiently demonstrate the required
degree of nexus between the private actors and the government.310 In other words,
they did not show that they were operating under official capacity or under the
color of law.311 Ironically, throughout history, it is in these types of ambiguous
300. See Jeannie Shawl, Federal Judge Sets Aside Verdict In Iraq Contract Fraud Case, JURIST
LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Aug. 20, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/
2006/08/federal-judge-sets-aside-verdict-in.php [hereinafter Shawl].
301. Id.
302. Shawl, supra note 300; see also Erik Eckholm, U.S. Judge Sets Aside Verdict of Corporate
Fraud in Iraq on Technical Grounds, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 19, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/08/19/world/africa/19iht-web.0819reconstruct.2536456.html? r-1 [hereinafter Eckholm].
303. Eckholm, supra note 302.
304. Id.
305. See id
306. Id. (reporting that there were dozens of others that were ready to be filed at the time this case
was decided).
307. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (2006).
308. Id. at 56-57.
309. See id
310. Id. at 57.
311. Id. at 57-58. (In so holding, the court emphasized that in Sosa, the Supreme Court clearly
held that lower "federal courts should be extremely cautious about discovering new offenses among the
law of nations....") Id. at 57-58.
408 VOL. 3 8:3
STATUS OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS
situations that the services of the private military contractors are needed the
most.312  That is an additional reason why their legal status must be properly
defined and their conduct properly regulated.
The third obstacle to the success of civil suits against private military
companies is the government contractor defense. The government contractor
defense was initially endorsed by the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp.313 The doctrine essentially extends sovereign immunity to private actors
performing services under a government contract. 14 That would evidently create a
gap in accountability. A good demonstration of this is the Abu Ghraib situation,
where the private military contractors were involved under a government
contract. 315  They have essentially escaped any kind of criminal accountability 3 16
for which their military counterparts were punished. This might also invoke
sovereign immunity to avoid civil liability under the Boyle government contractor
doctrine.3 17 That would be a win-win situation for private actors.
2. State Responsibility
We now know that sixteen of the forty-four incidents at Abu Ghraib were
committed by private contractors.3 18 If Iraq were to seek redress under
international law, would the United States be responsible for all of the incidents or
just the twenty-eight incidents that its own military personnel committed? The
answer to this question is not straightforward because some of the same private-
government nexus issues discussed in the above subsection arise in almost an
identical way. However, this subsection suggests that state responsibility could be
established more easily than the private-government nexus in the domestic law
context.
The International Law Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides the following general
principle: "Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that state."3 19 According to the ILC, two important elements must
312. See, e.g., CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 39 ("Private actors, such as free
companies, contracted units, military entrepreneurs, and charter companies played key roles in state-
building and often served government interests. These organizations also had the tendency to become
powers unto themselves, however, and often grew superior in power to local political institutions,
particularly in areas of weak governance.").
313. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 514 (1988).
314. See id at 12; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1997).
315. P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2004, at B03
[hereinafter The Contract the Military Needs to Break].
316. Id.
317. Professor Laura Dickinson suggests that because Boyle was a products liability case, in which
the contractor followed government specifications relating to design, it could be argued that the doctrine
does not extend to the provision of services where such instructions do not exist. Government for Hire,
supra note 29, at 189. It could also be argued, however, that civilian contractors performing services
pursuant to government instructions would also enjoy sovereign immunity. Pending litigation would
resolve some of these issues. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C 2006).
318. The Contract the Military Needs to Break, supra note 315.
319. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
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be met cumulatively: a breach of international law and attribution to the state.32
The existence or non-existence of both elements is determined by international
law. 321
The most relevant part of the two-part equation is the attribution requirement.
The question that needs to be answered is thus, when does the conduct of private
military contractors bind the state that employs their services? According to the
ILC, the general principle is that the state would be responsible for the actions of
its own organs, which includes all three branches of government and their political
subdivisions.322 This principle is simple. To go back to the Abu Ghraib example,
the United States would be held responsible for the conduct of its military
personnel under this general principle. The ILC articles also make it clear that
States may be held responsible for the conduct of private actors if the following
requirements are met:
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State
under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to
exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an
act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is
acting in that capacity in the particular instance. 323
The most important element here seems to be the empowerment of a private
or para-statal entity to perform an inherently governmental function. In his
commentary on this particular provision, Professor James Crawford offers the
following example: "[i]n some countries private security firms may be contracted
to act as prison guards and in that capacity may exercise public powers such as
powers of detention and discipline pursuant to a judicial sentence or to prison
regulations."324 Providing security services in prisons administered by a state
outside of the territory would not change the equation.
Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, art. 1 (2001) [hereinafter
ILC]. Reprinted with commentary in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 61 (2002) [hereinafter CRAWFORD]. "Text adopted by the
Commission at is fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the
Commission's report covering the work of that session. The report, which also contains commentaries
on the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II (Part
Two). Text reproduced as it appears in the General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001,
and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. J)/Corr.4." Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%/20articles/9 6 2001.pdf.
320. ILC, supra note 319, art. 2.
321. Id. art. 3.
322. Id. art. 4
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or
any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State,
and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a
territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any person or entity which has
that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.
323. Id. art. 5.
324. See CRAWFORD, supra note 319, at 100.
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The one argument that may be raised is that the private military firms perform
their activities as a matter of contractual obligation, not as a matter of authorization
by law.325 Professor Crawford's commentary suggests that the authorization by
law is essential because the private entities bind their states as they are more or less
partial government entities themselves. He notes that the primary purpose for the
inclusion of these entities is because of the "increasing phenomenon of para-statal
entities, which exercise elements of governmental authority in place of state
organs."326
Although state responsibility for contract based private actions may raise
these kinds of issues, article 8 of the ILC draft provides a clear rule filling the gaps
left by the provisions discussed above. It states: "The conduct of a person or group
of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct."327 As long as "the
existence of a real link between the person or group performing the act and the
State machinery" is established, the State would be held liable.3 28 A contractual
relationship between the state and the private entity would obviously establish this
329link because it would amount to express authorization or ratification.
Nonetheless, a state in whose name violations have been committed by
private contractors would obviously argue that the authority it had given was
exceeded. However, under the ILC articles of state responsibility, the fact that the
private entity exceeded the lawful authority does not exonerate the state.330 Article
7 of the ILC articles provides that: "The conduct of an organ of a State or of a
person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority
shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person
or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes
instructions."' 31 This is a self explanatory provision, but again, there is nothing
that would prevent the state from holding the private contractor responsible for its
excesses and obtain indemnification for any damages that the state may incur as a
result of the private contractor's excesses.
It can safely be concluded, therefore, that the conduct of private military
contractors could potentially expose the state that employs their services to
325. The civilian almost always gets involved pursuant to contractual arrangements. See generally
Dickinson, Torture and Contract, supra note 208.
326. CRAWFORD, supra note 319, at 100.
327. ILC, supra note 319, art. 8.
328. CRAWFORD, supra note 319, at 110.
329. See IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, VOL. I, 160-
161:
In certain cases of special need the authorities of a state may supplement their
own actions by authorizing operations by private persons or groups designed as
'auxiliaries' or 'militia'. Such persons are not 'regular' or 'formal' elements in
the state apparatus but they do in fact act on behalf of the state conferring
authority.
330. ILC, supra note 319, art. 7.
331. Id.
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international legal responsibility. Accordingly, that is another important reason for
understanding their status and carefully regulating their conduct.
D. Drawing the Line: What may they do, and what must they not do?
As indicated above, not all activities of private military contractors can easily
be classified as legal or illegal. Most of the private military contractors perform
legitimate activities most of the time. As such, in times of war their legal status
fits nicely into the non-combatant designation of IHL. The serious challenge is,
however, to circumscribe the scope of their activities within the legal limits.
Although private military contractors share some fundamental similarities, it
cannot be concluded that they have a unitary status under IHL. In other words,
their status depends on the activities they perform at a given time and place.
The most important question that needs to be answered here is thus, where
must the line be drawn? Private military contractors that meet the requirements of
mercenaries are clearly banned. The problem with that is the extremely narrow
definition of Protocol I article 47.332 As indicated above, the United Nations
Mercenary Convention has broadened the definition by eliminating the
requirement of taking direct part in hostilities.333 According to this Convention,
therefore, private military contractors may be considered mercenaries if they
recruit personnel for combat and pay them in excess of what a regular soldier
would be paid under the same circumstances.334 This responsibility of the firms
attaches because the Convention holds not only the recruited foot-soldiers but also
the recruiters and financiers responsible for the same offenses.335 However,
perhaps because of the revisions in the definition of mercenary, this Convention
has not been ratified widely.336 That would mean that in states that did not ratify
this Convention, accountability may not attach until actual participation in
hostilities resumes. Aside from the ambiguity that results from the application of
the two alternative definitions of mercenary, it could safely be concluded that
engaging in combat, for pay, in a foreign land, without being a uniformed member
of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, remains prohibited. So, there is a
clear line.
Moving forward with the continuum, the next stage is the involvement of
private military contractors in support services without actually taking part in
actual combat. The standard set forth under IHL is that a civilian accompanying
the armed forces of a party to the conflict may not take direct part in hostilitieS33 7
or use the civilian status to cause harm to the enemy.338  These are difficult
332. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 47.
333. See International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of
Mercenaries, supra note 184, art. 1.
334. Id.
335. Id. at art. 2. ("Any person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries, as defined in
article 1 of the present Convention, commits an offence for the purposes of the Convention").
336. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Depositary Notifications (CNs) by the Secretary-General,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/CNs. Aspx (last visited June 25, 2007).
337. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(3).
338. Id. at art. 13. As indicated above, this standard is extracted from the rules that govem medical
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concepts to define, but unfortunately, under the existing IHL, that is where the line
must be drawn. Nonetheless, this line is extremely important because it offers a
solid foundation for further regulation.339
E. Going Forward: Conduct-based Time, Place, and Manner Regulation
The discussion so far has made one important matter clear: the status of
private military contractors under IHL depends on what they perform at a given
time and place and how they perform the activities. The legal literature and
international and domestic legislative initiatives presented thus far, by and large,
focus on ways of holding them directly accountable for illegitimate activities they
had already performed, or on the ways of regulating the whole private military
industry as a single unit through international mechanisms. Although both
approaches offer plausible alternatives, they clearly ignore the guidance that
already existing norms of IHL provide for future regulation. Precisely because of
that, they either treat the industry as a holistic unit or emphasize individual
accountability for wrongdoing after its occurrence. These shortcomings would
inevitably make the proposals incomplete. Some examples of these approaches are
briefly discussed below.
One common proposal is extending courts-martial jurisdiction to private
military contractors who engage in misconduct.340 This is a good proposal;
however, it does not resolve the underlying problem of unlawful combatancy,
because one may only be brought before courts-martial for a crime that had already
been committed. That would mean that there would be no penalty for crossing the
line drawn by IHL, for example, taking direct part in hostilities until such time that
a crime is committed. In other words, there would be no grounds to court-martial a
private military contractor who transports ammunition in a combat zone, even if
that conduct may be interpreted as taking direct part in hostilities under IHL.
Although the mere transportation of the ammunition may be prosecuted as aiding
and abetting the enemy while enjoying a civilian status, serious illegality would
ensue if the truck is attacked and the driver kills enemy soldiers and gets
captured. 341 A mere participation or even the killing of an enemy soldier is not a
conduct that would be prosecuted before the courts-martial of the employing state
unless a war crime had been committed. As such, the courts-martial proposal for
units. Although the provision is exclusively dedicated to the regulation of medical units, it is evident
that the principle has a broader meaning, particularly when read together with the other provisions of
the Protocol dealing with the protection of civilians in armed conflict. See id. at art. 67.
339. The ICRC's 2009 interpretive guide on the notion of direct participation in hostilities could be
a very useful tool in determining the nature of activities that would cross the line for this purpose. See
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION
IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/
Web/eng/siteengo.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-report res/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009-
icrc.pdf.
340. A notable proponent of this proposal is professor Wm. C. Peters of the United States Military
Academy, West Point. See Peters, supra note 29.
341. And, of course, the driver would raise the issue of self-defense but the very fact that he took
direct part in hostilities by transporting weaponry may override the defense. This is, however, a matter
for the enemy's adjudication of the details of the case.
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private military contractors is limited to holding wrongdoers responsible from the
point of view of the employer state after recognizable crimes had been committed.
It is an important tool but it does not address the greater need for proper regulation
of the conduct of private military contractors with a view to ensuring compliance
with international humanitarian norms.
The other notable domestic proposal is a contracts-based proposal.342 Under
this proposal, the contract that the private military contractors sign could be used
as a tool to regulate their conduct. This is a very good proposal. However, this
proposal presents four problems. First, the nature of contracts will always depend
on the circumstances, particularly the negotiating powers of the parties at a given
time and place.343 Secondly, because the contracts approach is inherently ad hoc, it
cannot possibly bring uniformity and order to the private military industry.
Thirdly, since it is not a legal requirement, the contracts will always remain open
for re-negotiation. Fourthly, such contracts are almost always confidential and
shielded from public scrutiny. That would mean that the industry would be
governed by unknown sets of contractual terms.
The second set of proposals envisions regulations of an international nature.
For example, Judge Advocate Todd Milliard proposes an international convention
establishing a regime of accountability and licensing.3 44 Similarly, Dr. Singer
argues that given the industry's ability to globalize and avoid domestic
accountability, a successful regulation must be international in nature.3 45  He
recognizes that banning the provision of military services altogether is not realistic
given today's supply and demand environment.346 He then proposes an
international mechanism of registration, licensing, and auditing under the United
Nations Secretary General's Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism.347 He also
proposes that this mechanism be supported by international experts on issues of
regulation, evaluation, and codes of conduct.3 48 According to him, this will help
transform the industry into a sanctioned international business industry.349
342. The proponent of this approach is Professor Laura Dickinson of the University of
Connecticut. See Public Law Values in a Privatized World, supra note 26, at 401 (advocating a
contract-based approach); see also Government for Hire, supra note 29, at 199; see also Torture and
Contract, supra note 208, at 273-74.
343. For example, if the government is badly in need of extinguishing a fire at a military base in
Kuwait within 24 hours and the only company that can do the job is KBR, the company may strike a
deal for additional future contracts in combat zones in Iraq as a condition of accepting the Kuwait
project. And if the Iraq project is awarded in exchange for the badly needed Kuwait project, the
company may risk being considered as having taken direct part in hostilities depending on what was set
ablaze in the Iraqi conflict zone. That would potentially expose KBR personnel to unlawful combatant
status. This is, of course, assuming that the adversary itself is a lawful combatant.
344. Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate
Private Military Companies, 176 ML. L. REv. 1, 79-84 (2003) (recognizing the importance of domestic
regulation).
345. See War, Profits, and the Vacuum ofLaw, supra note 24, at 544.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 545.
3 4 8. Id.
349. Id. at 545-46.
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There have also been legislative initiatives. Two notable examples are the
2002 United Kingdom Green Paper prepared by the order of the House of
Commons entitled Private Military Companies Options for Regulations,3 5 0 and the
1998 South African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act.3 51 These two
initiatives are discussed in turn below.
The U.K. Green Paper contains a somewhat thorough analysis of the private
military industry and proposes options for the domestic regulation of the
industry.352 The basic proposal assesses the pros and cons of each option. The
options include banning military activities abroad altogether,353 and also banning
recruitment for military activities abroad.354 Alternatively, it would establish a
licensing regime for military services, which includes registration and notification
requirements.35 The final and additional option contained in the Green Paper is
self-regulation in the form of voluntary codes of conduct.356 The proposal was
written with the following fundamental assumption in mind:
The distinction between combat and non-combat operations is often
artificial. The people who fly soldiers and equipment to the battlefield
are as much a part of the military operation as those who do the
shooting. At one remove the same applies to those who help with
maintenance, training, intelligence, planning and organization - each of
these can make a vital contribution to the war fighting capability. 357
Although this is completely true, the problem with this premise is that it does
not seem to have been properly informed by the standards set forth under the
existing norms of IHL. As discussed in several sections above, IHL actually
makes a distinction between those who fly the aircraft with the authorization to
shoot, and civilian crew members of military aircraft who are not authorized to
shoot.358 Unlike the assumption made above, their status and treatment is actually
distinct. It is only if the civilian members take direct part in hostilities that their
350. BRITISH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS
FOR REGULATION (2002), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf4/fco_pdf private
militarycompanies [hereinafter BRITISH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE]. The Green Paper
was prepared by the order of the House of Commons, however, proposals forwarded were not
considered by the House as of the writing of this article. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION, 2002, H.C. 577.
351. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supra note 268. South Africa is at the
forefront of this regulation primarily because of its history. Some of the prominent military contractors
that operated in Africa, and elsewhere, in the post-colonial period had their origins in the apartheid
regime. For example, some executives of these firms occupied prominent positions in the Special
Forces of the apartheid regime. Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private
International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 75, 93-97 (1998).
352. See BRITISH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 350.
353. Id. at 22.
354. Id. at 23.
355. Id. at 24-25.
356. Id. at 26.
357. Id. at 8.
358. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4(A)(4).
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civilian status ceases. 359 The proposal uses the term "vital contribution" 360 which
is not a legally significant phrase as far as IHL is concerned. The proper standard
is "taking direct part in hostilities." 361 The use of different terminology in itself
may not be a serious problem but it demonstrates the lack of reliance on the most
appropriate and most relevant body of law.
The Green Paper could have been properly informed by the standards set
under IHL but it was not. As such, it suffers from that shortcoming. But more
importantly, just like all the other proposals discussed above, the theoretical
foundation of the proposals is based on the desire to regulate the industry as a
holistic unit as opposed to looking at the issue in terms of what conduct may or
may not be performed by whom and when. A reliance on the standards set forth
by international humanitarian law would have suggested such an approach.
South Africa's approach is more or less the same as the proposed U.K. Green
Paper approach, for example, licensing and monitoring of South African private
military service providers.362 The Act does not, however, make it abundantly clear
that South African private military contractors cannot take direct part in hostilities
no matter what the excuses may be.3 63  To be fair, the Act provides that
mercenaries are banned,364 and that the Ministry of Defense of South Africa may
not grant the request for a license if it "would be in conflict with the Republic's
obligations in terms of international law."3 6 5 However, it appears that firms may
359. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(3)
360. BRITISH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 350, at 8.
361. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(3).
362. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supra note 268, at Preamble.
363. See id. at art. 1(iii): "foreign military assistance" means military services or military-related
services, or any attempt, encouragement, incitement or solicitation to render
such services, in the form of-
(a) military assistance to a party to the armed conflict by means of-
(i) advice or training;
(ii) personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence or operational support;
(iii) personnel recruitment;
(iv) medical or para-medical services; or
(v) procurement of equipment;
(b) security services for the protection of individuals involved in armed
conflict or their property;
(c) any action aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining the
constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state;
(d) any other action that has the result of furthering the military interests of
a party to the armed conflict.
364. Id. at art. 2. The Act defines mercenary activity as "direct participation as a combatant in
armed conflict for private gain." Id. at art. 1(iv). It is important to note that "private gain" is a
requirement that could easily be masked with allegations of protection of public order or democratic
institutions or government. It is also important to note that the requirement of "direct participation" is
at odds with the definition of the U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries. See UN Convention Against
Mercenaries, supra note 184, art. 1.
365. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supra note 268, art. 7(1)(a). It is important to
note here that the manner in which the criteria is stated suggests that combat operations are not
outlawed or excluded in their entirety, but somehow regulated through licensing procedures. It is also
important to note that South Africa is not a signatory to the O.A.U. Convention for the Elimination of
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operate under a lawful license to "do any action that has the result of furthering the
military interest of a party to the armed conflict."366 The fundamental flaw is thus,
just like the approaches discussed above, the theoretical foundation is not the
standards set by IHL. It also attempts to regulate the industry as a holistic unit.
Apparently, the Ministry would issue the license based on paperwork filed
according to the requirements. The criteria set forth under article 7(1) are not only
very general but also make no reference to IHL in particular,367 which is the most
pertinent body of law that must have guided the drafting of the Act.
All of the above discussed proposals, which fairly represent the proposals
circulating today, have one remarkable characteristic in common - they attempt to
regulate the private military industry as one holistic unit and ignore the valuable
guidance offered by IHL. This article proposes a different approach, a time, place,
and manner regulation based on the standards provided by JHL. More particularly,
it suggests that instead of attempting to regulate the industry as a whole, which is
extremely diverse and in everyone's 401(k) portfolio (to use Dr. Singer's
words),368 compliance could reasonably be attained if the time, place, and manner
of their operations are regulated based on the standards already provided by IHL.
The application and use of these standards, which are discussed at length in the
Mercenarism in Africa. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Convention of the OA Ufor the Elimination
of Mercenarism in Africa, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/WebSign?ReadForm&id= 4 8 5&ps=S (last
visited June 27, 2007). See Tiyanjana Maluwa, South Africa and the African Union, 2 INT'L ORG. L.
REV 103, 117-22 (2005) (commenting on South Africa's lack of ratification).
"Criteria for granting or refusal of authorizations and approvals
7. (1) An authorisation or approval in terms of sections 4 and 5 may not be
granted if
it would-
(a) be in conflict with the Republic's obligations in terms of international law;
(b) result in the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
territory in which the foreign military assistance is to be rendered;
(c) endanger the peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into the
region where the assistance is to be, or is likely to be, rendered or would
otherwise contribute to regional instability and would negatively influence the
balance of power in such region;
(d) support or encourage terrorism in any manner;
(e) contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts;
(fW prejudice the Republic's national or international interests;
(g) be unacceptable for any other reason.
(2) A person whose application for an authorisation or approval in terms of
section 4
or 5 has not been granted by the Minister may request the Minister to furnish
written
reasons for his or her decision.
(3) The Minister shall furnish the reasons referred to in subsection (2) within a
reasonable time." Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supra note
268, art. 7(1)(a).
366. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supra note 268, art. 1(iii) (d). When read with
articles 4 and 5, the meaning stated above is indicated.
367. See id at art. 7(1).
368. War, Profits and the Vacuum ofLaw, supra note 24, at 522.
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previous sections, render illegal certain conduct based on the place, time, and
manner of their performance. A valid regulation would therefore follow this
already existing guidance.
For instance, the two most important areas where the standards set by IHL,
namely, taking direct part in hostilities or causing harm to the enemy, create some
ambiguity are in services that involve transportation of military supplies and
construction of bases. To take the Iraq situation as a demonstration of issues
pertaining to transportation, under the standards of IHL discussed above, it would
appear that while a private contractor may transport weapons and ammunition
from Maryland to Qatar, it may not transport the same package across the
Euphrates River to supply an Infantry Division stationed deep inside Iraq because
the latter could reasonably be interpreted as taking direct part in hostilities.369
Proceeding with the same assumptions (because at least theoretically this is true in
most other conflicts), if a private military contractor is captured while transporting
military equipment, that person would not be entitled to prisoner of war status and
may be prosecuted for whatever conduct he or she had performed. If, however, the
supply was food, water, and medicine instead of ammunition, IHL protects the
driver as a civilian and he must be treated as a prisoner of war and returned
unharmed at the conclusion of the hostilities. 370
Construction is another area of ambiguity. Going back to the Yugoslavian
example, while a private military contractor may build a refugee camp in
Macedonia, it cannot lawfully build a military barricade in Srebrenica, which
would clearly mean taking direct part in hostilities.
Therefore, to the extent some of the conduct they perform might be
interpreted as direct participation in hostilities or causing harm to the enemy, in the
interest of ensuring the legality of the activities of private military contractors,
states that host them and employ their services must in their domestic laws define
the line more clearly and prohibit conduct that would not only expose the firms to
liability and the persons serving on the ground to danger but also lead to the host
state's international responsibility. The easiest and most appropriate regulation
would be a time, place, and manner regulation.
For instance, in the Yugoslavia example discussed above, it may be provided
that while a private military contractor may transport supplies including military
supplies from Maryland to Bonn, it may not fly the same supplies from Bonn to an
airport near Belgrade, where there would be a high risk of becoming involved in an
unauthorized conflict. So, instead of prohibiting the transportation of military
equipment by private contractors altogether, the regulations may provide for a
reasonable limit as to the time, place, and manner of the provision of the services.
That would not only avoid situations whereby private personnel would be drawn or
369. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 27.
370. Although the Iraq situation is used as an example because of its current importance, it is
important to note that the nature of the conflict is atypical. Thus, such assumptions need to be made.
Of course, the examples make more sense in conventional inter-state conflicts, where both parties
consider themselves bound by JHL.
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forced into combat activity without lawful authorization, but would also spare the
state using their services of international responsibility for violations of IHL.
Similarly, reasonable time, place, and manner regulation should also work well for
construction services, which is one of the most important services provided by
private military contractors. In this respect, the regulation may provide that
contractors may not perform construction activities within some miles of active
hostilities until such time that the hostilities cease. The details of the regulations
would obviously need to be looked into very carefully.
V. CONCLUSION
Private military contractors will continue to complicate the equation relating
to international peace and security for the foreseeable future. As their re-
emergence is a twenty-first century phenomenon, their status as a unitary entity is
not directly defined by international humanitarian law whose marked development
preceded the advent of the post-Cold War era proliferation of private military
contractors. However, international humanitarian law defines the status of each
and every person involved in and affected by warfare. When private military
personnel perform war-related activities, whether in the form of the design of
precision weaponry from an office in Bethesda, Maryland, or in the form of
transporting ammunition in Kosovo, or chasing terrorists in Afghanistan, their
status at each given moment and place is well defined under international
humanitarian law. Therefore, what could be concluded about the status of private
military contractors under international humanitarian law is that it depends on what
they do and where, when, and how they do it. That is precisely why attempting to
regulate the industry as a whole without seeking guidance from international
humanitarian law is often a futile exercise.
This article has attempted to demonstrate the status of military contractors in a
continuum. It highlighted not only the two extremes, the perfectly legal activities
and clearly illegal activities, but also described the challenges involved in
classifying certain activities, and attempted to show where the line must be drawn.
As such, states that consider themselves bound by international humanitarian law
should regulate the provision of military-related services by private parties using
the standards set forth under international humanitarian law. The use of these
standards would inevitably require a time, place, and manner regulatory regime.
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